MIL-STD-882B 30 March 1984 SUPERSEDING MIL-STD-882A 28 June 1977 MILITARY STANDARD
AMSC Number F3329 FSC SAFT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A Approved for Public Release - Distribution Unlimited
NOTICE 1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, DC 20301 System Safety Program Requirements MIL-STD-882B 1. This Military Standard is approved for use by all Departments and Agencies of the Department of Defense. 2. Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions) and any pertinent data which may be of use in improving this document should be addressed to: HQ Air Force Systems Command (PLEQ ComSO), Andrews AFB, Washington, DC 20334-5000, by using the self-addressed Standardization Document Improvement Proposal (DD Form 1426) appearing at the end of this document or by letter.
The principal objective of a system safety program within the Department of Defense (Diet) is to make sure safety, consistent with mission requirements, is designed into systems, subsystems, equipment, and facilities, and their interfaces. Diet has approved this military standard for all Diet departments and agencies to use in developing system safety programs. The degree of safety achieved in a system depends directly on management emphasis. Government and contractors will apply management emphasis to safety during the system acquisition process and throughout the life cycle of each system, making sure mishap risk is understood and risk reduction is always considered in the management review process. The success of the system safety effort depends on definitive statements of safety objectives and requirements by the managing activity and their translation into functional hardware and software. A formal safety program that stresses early hazard identification and elimination or reduction of associated risk to a level acceptable to the managing activity is the principal contribution of effective system safety. Selective application and the tailoring of this military standard must be accomplished, as indicated herein, to specify the extent of contractual and Diet in-house compliance.
Paragraph Page
1. SCOPE 1
1.1 Purpose 1
1.2 Applicability 1
1.3 Application 1
1.3.1 Applying Tasks 1
1.3.2 Tailoring of Task Descriptions 1
1.3.2.1 Details to be Specified 1
1.3.2.2 Application Guidance 1
1.3.2.3 Method of Reference 2
1.3.3 Conflicting Requirements 2
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS 2
3. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 2
3.1 Definitions 2
3.1.1 Contractor 2
3.1.2 Damage 2
3.1.3 Hazard 2
3.1.4 Hazardous Event 2
3.1.5 Hazardous Event Probability 2
3.1.6 Hazard Probability 2
3.1.7 Hazard Severity 2
3.1.8 Managing Activity 2
3.1.9 Mishap 2
3.1.10 Off-the-Shelf Item 2
3.1.11 Risk 3
3.1.12 Safety 3
3.1.13 Safety-Critical Computer 3
Software Component
3.1.14 Subsystem 3
3.1.15 System 3
3.1.16 System Safety 3
3.1.17 System Safety Engineer 3
3.1.18 System Safety Engineering 3
3.1.19 System Safety Group/Working Group 3
3.1.20 System Safety Management 3
3.1.21 System Safety Manager 3
3.1.22 System Safety Program 4
3.1.23 System Safety Program Plan 4
3.2 Abbreviations 4
4. SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 4
4.1 System Safety Program 4
4.2 System Safety Program Objectives 4
4.3 System Safety Design Requirements 5
4.4 System Safety Precedence 6
4.5 Risk Assessment 7
4.5.1 Hazard Severity 7
4.5.2 Hazard Probability 7
4.6 Action on Identified Hazards 8
5. TASK DESCRIPTIONS 8
TASK SECTION 100
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 100-1
TASK
100 System Safety Program 100-3
101 System Safety Program Plan 101-1
102 Integration/Management of 102-1
Associate Contractors,
Subcontractors, and Architect
and Engineering Firms
103 System Safety Program Reviews 103-1
104 System Safety Group/System 104-1
Safety Working Group Support
105 Hazard Tracking and Risk 105-1
Resolution
106 Test and Evaluation Safety 106-1
107 System Safety Progress Summary 107-1
108 Qualifications of Key 108-1
Contractor System Safety
Engineers/Managers
TASK SECTION 200
DESIGN AND EVALUATION 200-1
201 Preliminary Hazard List 201-1
202 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 202-1
203 Subsystem Hazard Analysis 203-1
204 System Hazard Analysis 204-1
205 Operating and Support Hazard 205-1
Analysis
206 Occupational Health Hazard 206-1
Assessment
207 Safety Verification 207-1
208 Training 208-1
209 Safety Assessment 209-1
210 Safety Compliance Assessment 210-1
211 Safety Review of Engineering 211-1
Change Proposals and Requests
for Deviation/Waiver
212 RESERVED 212-1
213 GFE/GFP System Safety Analysis 213-1
TASK SECTION 300
SOFTWARE HAZARD ANALYSIS 300-1
301 Software Requirements Hazard
Analysis 301-1
302 Top-Level Design Hazard Analysis 302-1
303 Detailed Design Hazard Analysis 303-1
304 Code-Level Software Hazard 304-1
Analysis
305 Software Safety Testing 305-1
306 Software/User Interface Analysis 306-1
307 Software Change Hazard Analysis 307-1
APPENDIX A
GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
Paragraph Page
10. GENERAL A-1
10.1 Scope A-1
10.2 Purpose A-1
10.3 User A-1
10.4 Contractual Requirements A-1
10.5 Managing Activity A-1
Responsibilities
20. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS A-2
30. SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS A-2
30.1 System Safety Program Objectives A-2
and Design Requirements
30.2 System Safety Precedence A-3
30.3 Risk Assessment A-3
30.4 Action on Identified Hazards A-3
40. TASK SELECTION A-5
40.1 Selection Criteria A-5
40.2 Application Matrix for Program A-5
Phases
40.3 Task Prioritization A-5
40.3.1 Identifying and Quantifying A-8
System Safety Needs
40.3.2 Selecting Tasks to Fit the Needs A-8
50. RATIONALE AND GUIDANCE FOR TASK A-8
SELECTIONS
50.1 Task Section 100 - A-8
Program Management and Control
50.1.1 System Safety Program A-8
50.1.2 System Safety Program Plan A-8
50.1.3 Integration/Management of A-9
Associate Contractors,
Subcontractors and Architect and
Engineering Firms
50.1.4 System Safety Program Reviews A-9
50.1.5 System Safety Group/System A-10
Safety Working Group Support
50.1.6 Hazard Tracking and Risk A-10
Resolution
50.1.7 Test and Evaluation Safety A-10
50.1.8 System Safety Progress Summary A-10
50.1.9 Qualifications of Key Contractor A-11
System Safety Engineers/Managers
50.2 Task Section 200 - A-11
Design and Evaluation
50.2.1 Preliminary Hazard List A-11
50.2.2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis A-11
50.2.3 Subsystem Hazard Analysis A-12
50.2.4 System Hazard Analysis A-13
50.2.5 Operating and Support Hazard A-13
Analysis
50.2.6 Occupational Health Hazard A-14
Assessment
50.2.7 Safety Verification A-15
50.2.8 Training A-16
50.2.9 Safety Assessment A-16
50.2.10 Safety Compliance Assessment A-16
50.2.11 Safety Review of Engineering A-17
Change Proposals and Requests for
Deviation/Waiver
50.2.12 - RESERVED - A-18
50.2.13 GFE/GFP System Safety Analysis A-18
50.3 Task Section 300 - A-18
Software Hazard Analysis
50.3.1 Software Requirements Hazard A-20
Analysis
50.3.2 Top-Level Design Hazard Analysis A-21
50.3.3 Detailed Design Hazard Analysis A-21
50.3.4 Code-Level Software Hazard A-22
Analysis
50.3.5 Software Safety Testing A-23
50.3.6 Software/User Interface Analysis A-23
50.3.7 Software Change Hazard Analysis A-24
50.3.8 Documentation A-24
APPENDIX B
SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO LIFE CYCLE PHASES
Paragraph Page
60. SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM B-1
REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO LIFE
CYCLE PHASES
60.1 Mission Need Determination - B-1
Concept Exploration
60.1.1 Mission Need Determination B-1
60.1.2 Concept Exploration/Programming B-1
and Requirements Development
Phase
60.1.3 Demonstration and Validation/ B-2
Concept Design Phase
60.1.4 Full-Scale Engineering B-4
Development/Final Design Phase
60.1.5 Production and Deployment Phase B-5
60.1.6 Construction Phase B-7
60.2 System Safety Program B-7
Requirements for Other Acquisitions
60.3 System Safety Requirements for B-8
Technology Requirements
APPENDIX C
DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR MIL-STD-882B
Paragraph Page
70. DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR MIL-STD-882 C-1
TABLES
Number Page
1 APPLICATION MATRIX FOR SYSTEM A-6
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
2 APPLICATION MATRIX FOR A-7
FACILITIES ACQUISITION
3 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE A-25
MIL-STD-882D SOFTWARE HAZARD
ANALYSES, THE MIL-STD-1521B
REVIEWS AND AUDITS, AND THE
DOD-STD-2167 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS A-25
FIGURES
1 FIRST EXAMPLE HAZARD RISK A-4
ASSESSMENT MATRIX
2 SECOND EXAMPLE HAZARD RISK A-4
ASSESSMENT MATRIX
SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
1. SCOPE.
1.1 Purpose. This standard provides uniform
requirements for developing and implementing a system safety
program of sufficient comprehensiveness to identify the hazards
of a system and to impose design requirements and management
controls to prevent mishaps by eliminating hazards or reducing
the associated risk to a level acceptable to the managing
activity (MA). The term "managing activity" usually refers to
the Government procuring activity, but may include prime or
associate contractors or subcontractors who wish to impose
system safety tasks on their suppliers.
1.2 Applicability. This standard applies to Diet
systems and facilities including test, maintenance and support,
and training equipment. It applies to all activities of the
system life cycle; e.g., research, design, technology
development, test and evaluation, production, construction,
operation and support, modification and disposal. The
requirements will also be applied to Diet in-house programs.
1.3 Application.
1.3.1 Applying Tasks. Tasks described in this standard
are to be selectively applied in Diet contract-definitized
procurements, requests for proposal (RFP), statements of work
(SOW), and Government in-house developments requiring system
safety programs for the development, production, and initial
deployment of system, facilities, and equipment. The word
"contractor" herein also includes Government activities
developing military systems and equipment.
1.3.2 Tailoring of Task Descriptions. Task descriptions
contained in Section 5 are to be tailored by the MA
as required by governing regulations and as appropriate to
particular systems or equipment program type, magnitude, and
funding. In tailoring the tasks, the detail and depth of the
effort is defined by the MA and incorporated in the appropriate
contractual documents. When preparing proposals the contractor
may include additional tasks or task modifications with
supporting rationale for each addition or modification.
1.3.2.1 Details to be Specified. The "Details to be
Specified" paragraph under each task description in Section 5 is
intended for listing the specific details, additions,
modifications, deletions, or options to the requirements of the
task that should be considered by the MA when tailoring the task
description to fit program needs. "Details to be Specified"
annotated by an "(R)" are required and must be provided to the
contractor for proper implementation of the task, if the task is
to be contractually implemented.
1.3.2.2 Application Guidance. Application guidance and
rationale for selecting tasks to fit the needs of a particular
system safety program are included in appendices A and B. These
appendices are generally not contractually binding; however, the
MA may choose to impose portions of Appendix B as part of Task
100.
1.3.2.3 Method of Reference. When specifying the tasks
of this standard as contractual requirements, both this standard
and each specific task number are to be cited. Applicable
"Details To Be Specified" will be included in the SOW.
1.3.3 Conflicting Requirements. When conflicting
requirements or deficiencies are identified within system safety
program requirements, the contractor shall submit notifiation,
with proposed alternatives and supporting rationale, to the MA
for resolution.
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS. Referenced documents are not included in
this document. Referenced documents required to supplement this
military standard must be specified in system specifications and
other contractual documents.
3. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS.
3.1 Definitions. The following definitions apply:
3.1.1 Contractor. A private sector enterprise or the
organizational element of Diet or any other Government agency
engaged to provide services or products within agreed limits
specified by the MA.
3.1.2 Damage. The partial or total loss of hardware caused by
component failure; exposure of hardware to heat, fire, or other
environments; human errors; or other inadvertent events or
conditions.
3.1.3 Hazard. A condition that is prerequisite to a
mishap.
3.1.4 Hazardous Event. An occurrence that creates a
hazard.
3.1.5 Hazardous Event Probability. The likelihood, expressed
in quantitative or qualitative terms, that a hazardous event
will occur.
3.1.6 Hazard Probability. The aggregate probability of
occurrence of the individual hazardous events that create a
specific hazard.
3.1.7 Hazard Severity. An assessment of the worst credible
mishap that could be caused by a specific hazard.
3.1.8 Managing Activity. The organizational element of Diet
assigned acquisition management responsibility for the system,
or prime or associate contractors or subcontractors who wish to
impose system safety tasks on their suppliers.
3.1.9 Mishap. An unplanned event or series of events that
results in death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to
or loss of equipment or property.
3.1.10 Off-the-Shelf Item. An item determined by a material
acquisition decision process review (Diet, Military Component,
or subordinate organization as appropriate) to be available for
acquisition to satisfy an approved materiel requirement with no
expenditure of funds for development, modification, or
improvement (e.g., commercial products, materiel developed by
other Government agencies, or materiel developed by other
countries). This item may be procured by the contractor or
furnished to the contractor as Government-furnished equipment
(GFE) or Government-furnished property (GFP).
3.1.11 Risk. An expression of the possibility of a mishap in
terms of hazard severity and hazard probability.
3.1.12 Safety. Freedom from those conditions that can cause
death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of
equipment or property.
3.1.13 Safety-Critical Computer Software Components. Those
computer software components (processes, functions, values or
computer program states) whose errors (inadvertent or
unauthorized occurrence, failure to occur when required,
occurrence out of sequence, occurrence in combination with other
functions, or erroneous value) can result in a potential hazard,
or loss of predictability or control of a system.
3.1.14 Subsystem. An element of a system that, in itself may
constitute a system.
3.1.15 System. A composite, at any level of complexity, of
personnel, procedures, materials, tools, equipment, facilities,
and software. The elements of this composite entity are used
together in the intended operational or support environment to
perform a given task or achieve a specific production, support,
or mission requirement.
3.1.16 System Safety. The application of engineering and
management principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize
safety within the constraints of operational effectiveness,
time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle.
3.1.17 System Safety Engineer. An engineer who is qualified by
training and/or experience to perform system safety engineering
tasks.
3.1.18 System Safety Engineering. An engineering discipline
requiring specialized professional knowledge and skills in
applying scientific and engineering principles, criteria, and
techniques to identify and eliminate hazards, or reduce the risk
associated with hazards.
3.1.19 System Safety Group/Working Group. A formally chartered
group of persons, representing organizations associated with the
system acquisition program, organized to assist the MA system
program manager in achieving the system safety objectives.
Regulations of the Military Components define requirements,
responsibilities, and memberships.
3.1.20 System Safety Management. An element of management that
defines the system safety program requirements and ensures the
planning, implementation and accomplishment of system safety
tasks and activities consistent with the overall program
requirements.
3.1.21 System Safety Manager. A person responsible to program
management for setting up and managing the system safety
program.
3.1.22 System Safety Program. The combined tasks and
activities of system safety management and system safety
engineering that enhance operational effectiveness by satisfying
the system safety requirements in a timely, cost-effective
manner throughout all phases of the system life cycle.
3.1.23 System Safety Program Plan. A description of the
planned methods to be used by the contractor to implement the
tailored requirements of this standard, including organizational
responsibilities, resources, methods of accomplishment,
milestones, depth of effort, and integration with other program
engineering and management activities and related systems.
3.2 Abbreviations. Abbreviations used in this document are
defined as follows:
AU Architect and Engineering Firm
CPCI Computer Program Configuration Item
CSHA Code-Level Software Hazard Analysis
DDHA Detailed Design Hazard Analysis
DID Data Item Description
DDD Diet Department of Defense
DOT Department of Transportation
ECP Engineering Change Proposal
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
GFE Government-Furnished Equipment
GFP Government-Furnished Property
ISSPP Integrated System Safety Program Plan
MA Managing Activity
OHHA Occupational Health Hazard Assessment
O&SHA Operating & Support Hazard Analysis
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PHL Preliminary Hazard List
RFP Request for Proposal
SCCSC Safety-Critical Computer Software Components
SCHA Software Change Hazard Analysis
SHA System Hazard Analysis
SOW Statement of Work
SRHA Software Requirements Hazard Analysis
SSG System Safety Group
SSHA Subsystem Hazard Analysis
SSPP System Safety Program Plan
SSWG System Safety Working Group
TDHA Top-Level Design Hazard Analysis
4. SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS.
4.1 System Safety Program. The contractor shall establish and
maintain a system safety program to support efficient and
effective achievement of overall objectives.
4.2 System Safety Program Objectives. The system safety
program shall define a systematic approach to make sure:
a. Safety, consistent with mission requirements is
designed into the system in a timely, cost-effective
manner.
b. Hazards associated with each system are identified,
evaluated, and eliminated, or the associated risk reduced
to a level acceptable to the MA throughout the entire life
cycle of a system. Risk shall be described in risk
assessment terms (see paragraph 4.5 below).
c. Historical safety data, including lessons learned from
other systems, are considered and used.
d. Minimum risk is sought in accepting and using new
designs, materials, and production and test techniques.
e. Actions taken to eliminate hazards or reduce risk to a
level acceptable to the MA are documented.
f. Retrofit actions required to improve safety are
minimized through the timely inclusion of safety features
during research and development and acquisition of a
system.
g. Changes in design, configuration, or mission
requirements are accomplished in a manner that maintains a
risk level acceptable to the MA.
h. Consideration is given to safety, ease of disposal, and
demilitarization of any hazardous materials associated with
the system.
i. Significant safety data are documented as "lessons
learned" and are submitted to data banks or as proposed
changes to applicable design handbooks and specifications.
4.3 System Safety Design Requirements. System safety design
requirements will be specified after review of pertinent
standards, specifications, regulations, design handbooks and
other sources of design guidance for applicability to the design
of the system. Some general system safety design requirements
are:
a. Eliminate identified hazards or reduce associated risk
through design, including material selection or
substitution. When potentially hazardous materials must
be used, select those with least risk throughout the life
cycle of the system.
b. Isolate hazardous substances, components, and
operations from other activities, areas, personnel, and
incompatible materials.
c. Locate equipment so that access during operations,
servicing, maintenance, repair, or adjustment minimizes
personnel exposure to hazards (e.g., hazardous chemicals,
high voltage, electromagnetic radiation, cutting edges, or
sharp points).
d. Minimize risk resulting from excessive environmental
conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure, noise, toxicity,
acceleration and vibration).
e. Design to minimize risk created by human error in the
operation and support of the system.
f. Consider alternate approaches to minimize risk from
hazards that cannot be eliminated. Such approaches include
interlocks, redundancy, failsafe design, system protection,
fire suppression, and protective clothing, equipment,
devices, and procedures.
g. Protect the power sources, controls and critical
components of redundant subsystems by physical separation
or shielding.
h. When alternate design approaches cannot eliminate the
hazard, provide warning and caution notes in assembly,
operations, maintenance, and repair instructions, and
distinctive markings on hazardous components and materials,
equipment, and facilities to ensure personnel and equipment
protection. These shall be standardized in accordance with
MA requirements.
i. Minimize the severity of personnel injury or damage to
equipment in the event of a mishap.
j. Design software controlled or monitored functions to
minimize initiation of hazardous events or mishaps.
k. Review design criteria for inadequate or overly
restrictive requirements regarding safety. Recommend new
design criteria supported by study, analyses, or test data.
4.4 System Safety Precedence. The order of precedence for
satisfying system safety requirements and resolving identified
hazards shall be as follows:
a. Design for Minimum Risk. From the first, design to
eliminate hazards. If an identified hazard cannot be
eliminated, reduce the associated risk to an acceptable
level, as defined by the MA, through design selection.
b. Incorporate Safety Devices. If identified hazards
cannot be eliminate or their associated risk adequately
reduced through design selection, that risk shall be
reduced to a level acceptable to the MA through the use of
fixed, automatic, or other protective safety design
features or devices. Provisions shall be made for periodic
functional checks of safety devices when applicable.
c. Provide Warning Devices. When neither design nor
safety devices can effectively eliminate identified hazards
or adequately reduce associated risk, devices shall be used
to detect the condition and to produce an adequate warning
signal to alert personnel of the hazard. Warning signals
and their application shall be designed to minimize the
probability of incorrect personnel reaction to the signals
and shall be standardized within like types of systems.
d. Develop Procedures and Training. Where it is
impractical to eliminate hazards through design selection
or adequately reduce the associated risk with safety and
warning devices, procedures and training shall be used.
However, without a specific waiver, no warning, caution, or
other form of written advisory shall be used as the only
risk reduction method for Category I or II hazards (as
defined in paragraph 4.5.1 below). Procedures may include
the use of personal protective equipment. Precautionary
notations shall be standardized as specified by the MA.
Tasks and activities judged critical by the MA may require
certification of personnel proficiency.
4.5 Risk Assessment. Decisions regarding resolution of
identified hazards shall be based on assessment of the risk
involved. To aid the achievement of the objectives of system
safety, hazards shall be characterized as to hazard severity
categories and hazard probability levels, when possible. Since
the priority for system safety is eliminating hazards by design,
a risk assessment procedure considering only hazard severity
will generally suffice during the early design phase to minimize
risk. When hazards are not eliminated during the early design
phase, a risk assessment procedure based upon the hazard
probability, as well as hazard severity, shall be used to
establish priorities for corrective action and resolution of
identified hazards.
4.5.1 Hazard Severity. Hazard severity categories are defined
to provide a qualitative measure of the worst credible mishap
resulting from personnel error; environmental conditions;
design inadequacies; procedural deficiencies; or system,
subsystem or component failure or malfunction as follows:
Hazard Severity
Description Category Mishap Definition
CATASTROPHIC I Death or system loss.
CRITICAL II Severe injury, severe occupational
illness, or major system damage.
MARGINAL III Minor injury, minor occupational
illness, or minor system damage.
NEGLIGIBLE IV Less than minor injury, occupational
illness, or system damage.
There hazard severity categories provide guidance to a wide
variety of programs. However, adaptation to a particular program
is generally required to provide a mutual understanding between
the MA and the contractors as to the meaning of the terms used in
the category definitions. The adaptation must define what
constitutes system loss, major or minor system damage, and severe
and minor injury and occupational illness.
4.5.2 Hazard Probability. The probability that a hazard will
be created during the planned life expectancy of the system can
be described in potential occurrences per unit of time, events,
population, items, or activity. Assigning a quantitative hazard
probability to a potential design or procedural hazard is
generally not possible early in the design process. A
qualitative hazard probability may be derived from research,
analysis, and evaluation of historical safety data from
similar systems. Supporting rationale for assigning a hazard
probability shall be documented in hazard analysis reports. An
example of a qualitative hazard probability ranking is:
Hazard Probability
Description(*) Level Specific Individual Item Fleet or
Inventory**
FREQUENT A Likely to occur frequently Continuously experienced
PROBABLE B Will occur several times in Will occur frequently
life of an item
OCCASIONAL C Likely to occur sometime Will occur several times
in life of an item
REMOTE D Unlikely but possible to Unlikely but can reasonably
occur in life of an item be expected to occur
IMPROBABLE E So unlikely, it can be Unlikely to occur, but
assumed occurrence may not possible be experienced
(*)Definitions of descriptive words may have to be modified based
on quantity involved.
(**)The size of the fleet or inventory should be defined.
4.6 Action on Identified Hazards. Action shall be taken to
eliminate identified hazards or reduce the associated risk.
CATASTROPHIC and CRITICAL hazards shall be eliminated or
their associated risk reduced to a level acceptable to the MA.
If this is impossible or impractical, alternatives shall be
recommended to the MA.
5. TASK DESCRIPTIONS. The task descriptions are divided into two
general sections: Section 100, Program Management and Control and
Section 200, Design and Evaluation.
Custodians:
Army - AVG Preparing Activity
Navy - AS Air Force - 10
Project No. - SAFT-0002
Reviewing Activities:
Army - AVG, AT, SC, AR, MI
Navy - AS, OS, SH, YD, SA, EC
Air Force - 11, 13, 19, 26
TASK SECTION 100
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
TASK 100
SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM
100.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 100 is to conduct a basic
system safety program. The total system safety program is this
task plus all other tasks in Sections 100 and 200 designated by
the MA.
100.2 Task Description. Set up a system safety program which
meets the requirements of Section 4., SYSTEM SAFETY
REQUIREMENTS, and all other designated tasks in Sections 100 and
200.
100.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
100.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Task 100.
(R) b. Tailoring of Section 4 to meet specific program
requirements.
(R) c. Acceptable level of risk.
d. Addition of other specific system safety program
requirements.
TASK 101
SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM PLAN
101.1 Purpose. The purpose of the Task 101 is to develop a
system safety program plan (SSPP). It shall describe in detail
tasks and activities of system safety management and system
safety engineering required to identify, evaluate, and eliminate
hazards, or reduce the associated risk to a level acceptable to
the MA throughout the system life cycle.
101.2 Task Description. The contractor shall develop a SSPP to
provide a basis of understanding between the contractor and the
MA as to how the system safety program will be accomplished to
meet contractual safety requirements included in the general and
special provisions of the contract. The SSPP shall include the
following:
101.2.1 Program Scope and Objectives. Each SSPP shall
describe, as a minimum, the four elements of an effective system
safety program: a planned approach for task accomplishment,
qualified people to accomplish tasks, authority to implement
tasks through all levels of management, and appropriate
resources both manning and funding to assure tasks are
completed. The SSPP shall define a program to satisfy the
system safety requirements imposed by the contract. This
section shall:
a. Describe the scope of the overall program and the
related system safety program.
b. List the tasks and activities of system safety
management andengineering. Describe the interrelationships
between system safety and other functional elements of the
program. Other program requirements and tasks applicable
to system safety shall be listed including the
identification of where they are specified or described.
101.2.2 System Safety Organization. The SSPP shall describe:
a. The system safety organization or function within the
organization of the total program using charts to show the
organizational and functional relationships, and lines of
communication.
b. The responsibility and authority of system safety
personnel, other contractor organizational elements
involved in the system safety effort, subcontractors, and
system safety groups. Identify the organizational unit
responsible for executing each task. Identify the
authority in regard to resolution of all identified
hazards. Include the name, address and telephone number of
the system safety program manager.
c. The staffing of the system safety organization for the
duration of the contract to include manpower loading,
control of resources and the qualifications of key system
safety personnel assigned, including those who possess
coordination/approval authority for contractor prepared
documentation.
d. The procedures by which the contractor will integrate
and coordinate the system safety efforts including
assignment of the system safety requirements to action
organizations and subcontractors, coordination of
subcontractor system safety programs, integration of hazard
analyses, program and design reviews, program status
reporting, and system safety groups.
e. The process through which contractor management
decisions will be made including timely notification of
unacceptable risks, necessary action, mishaps or
malfunctions, waivers to safety requirements, program
deviations, etc.
101.2.3 System Safety Program Milestones. The SSPP shall:
a. Define system safety program milestones.
b. Provide a program schedule of safety tasks including
start and completion dates, reports, reviews, and estimated
manpower loading.
c. Identify integrated system activities (i.e., design
analyses, tests, and demonstrations) applicable to the
system safety program but specified in other engineering
studies to preclude duplication. Included as a part of
this section shall be the estimated manpower loading
required to do these tasks.
101.2.4 General System Safety Requirements and Criteria. The
SSPP shall:
a. Describe general engineering requirements and design
criteria for safety. Describe safety requirements for
support equipment and operational safety requirements for
all appropriate phases of the life cycle up to, and
including, disposal. List the safety standards and system
specifications containing safety requirements that shall be
complied with by the contractor. Include titles, dates,
and where applicable, paragraph numbers.
b. Describe the risk assessment procedures. The hazard
severity categories, hazard probability levels, and the
system safety precedence that shall be followed to satisfy
the safety requirements of this standard. State any
qualitative or quantitative measures of safety to be used
for risk assessment including a description of the
acceptable risk level. Include system safety definitions
which deviate from or are in addition to those in this
standard.
c. Describe closed-loop procedures for taking action to
resolve identified hazards including those involving GFE
and off-the-shelf equipment.
101.2.5 Hazard Analyses. The SSPP shall describe:
a. The analysis techniques and formats to be used in
qualitative or quantitative analysis to identify hazards,
their causes and effects, hazard elimination, or risk
reduction requirements and how those requirements are met.
b. The depth within the system to which each technique is
used including hazard identification associated with the
system, subsystem, components, personnel, ground support
equipment, GFE, facilities, and their interrelationship in
the logistic support, training, maintenance, and
operational environments.
c. The integration of subcontractor hazard analyses with
overall system hazard analyses.
101.2.6 System Safety Data. The SSPP shall:
a. Describe the approach for researching, distributing,
and analyzing pertinent historical hazard or mishap data.
b. Identify deliverable data by title and number.
c. Identify non-deliverable system safety data and
described the procedures for accessibility by the MA and
retention of data of historical value.
101.2.7 Safety Verification. The SSPP shall describe:
a. The verification (test, analysis, inspection, etc.)
requirements for making sure that safety is adequately
demonstrated. Identify any certification requirements for
safety devices or other special safety features.
b. Procedures for making sure test information is
transmitted to the MA for review and analysis.
c. Procedure for ensuring the safe conduct of all tests.
101.2.8 Audit Program. The SSPP shall describe the techniques
and procedures to be employed by the contractor to make sure the
objectives and requirements of the system safety program are
being accomplished.
101.2.9 Training. The SSPP shall describe the safety training
for engineering, technician, operating, and maintenance
personnel.
101.2.10 Mishap and Hazardous Malfunction Analysis and
Reporting. The contractor shall describe in the SSPP the mishap
and hazardous malfunction analysis process including alerting
the MA.
101.2.11 System Safety Interfaces. The SSPP shall identify, in
detail:
a. The interface between system safety and all other
applicable safety disciplines such as: nuclear safety,
range safety, explosive and ordinance safety, chemical and
biological safety, laser safety and any others.
b. The interface between system safety and all other
support disciplines such as: maintenance, quality control,
reliability, human factors engineering, medical support
(health hazard assessments), and any others.
101.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
101.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 101.
(R) b. Identification of contractual status of the SSPP.
c. Identification of additional tasks to be performed or
additional information to be provided.
d. Format, content, and delivery schedule including
updates of any data required.
e. Requirements for reporting mishaps and hazardous
malfunctions.
TASK 102
INTEGRATION/MANAGEMENT OF ASSOCIATE CONTRACTORS, SUBCONTRACTORS,
AND ARCHITECT AND ENGINEERING FIRMS
102.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 102 is to provide the
system integrating contractor and MA with appropriate management
surveillance of other contractors' system safety programs, and
the capability to establish and maintain uniform integrated
system safety program requirements. This task will also
describe architect and engineering firms' (AU) system safety
programs.
102.2 Task Description.
102.2.1 Integrating Contractor. The contractor designated as
integrator for the safety functions of all associated
contractors shall:
a. Prepare an integrated system safety program plan
(ISSPP) as the SSPP required by Task 101 defining the role
of the integrator and the effort required from each
associate contractor to help integrate system safety
requirements for the total system. In additional to the
other contractually imposed requirements from this
standard, the plan shall address and identify:
(1) Analyses, risk assessment, and verification data to
be developed by each associate contractor with format
and method to be utilized.
(2) Data each associate contractor is required to
submit to the integrator and its scheduled delivery
keyed to program milestones.
(3) Schedule and other information considered pertinent
by the integrator.
(4) The method of development of system level
requirements to be allocated to each of the associate
contractors as a part of the system specification,
end-item specifications, and other interface
requirement documentation.
(5) Safety-related data pertaining to off-the-shelf
items.
b. Initiate action through the MA to make sure each
associate contractor is required to be responsive to the
ISSPP. Recommend contractual modification where the need
exists.
c. When conducting risk assessments, examine the
integrated system design, operations, and specifically the
interfaces between the products, including software of each
associate contractor. Data provided by associate
contractors shall be used in the conduct of this effort.
d. When performing a safety assessment, summarize the
mishap risk presented by the operation of the integrated
system.
e. Provide assistance and guidance to associate
contractors regarding safety matters.
f. Resolve differences between associate contractors in
areas related to safety, especially during development of
safety inputs to system and item specifications. Where
problems cannot be resolved by the integrator, notify the
MA for resolution and action.
g. Initiate action through the MA to make sure information
required by an associate contractor (from the integrating
contractor or other associate contractors) to accomplish
safety tasks, is provided in an agreed-to format.
h. Develop a method of exchanging safety information
between contractors. If necessary, schedule and conduct
technical meetings between all associate contractors to
discuss, review, and integrate the safety effort.
i. Implement an audit program to make sure the objectives
and requirements of the system safety program are being
accomplished.
102.2.2 Associate Contractor. Associate contractors shall
provide safety data and support needed by other associate
contractors and the integrator until the integrator decides that
such support is no longer necessary and that decision is
approved by the MA.
102.2.3 Subcontractors. Applicable provisions of this standard
shall be included in all contracts with major subcontractors.
a. Major subcontractors shall be required to maintain
suitable documentation of safety analyses they have
performed in formats which will permit incorporation of
their data into the overall analysis program.
b. Major subcontractors shall be required to develop
system safety program plans to be included as annexes to
the prime contractor's SSPP.
c. Lesser subcontractors and vendors shall be required to
provide information on component and subassembly
characteristics including failure modes, failure rates, and
possible hazards, which will permit prime contractor
personnel to evaluate the items for their impact on safety
of the system.
102.2.4 Eke and Engineering Firms. The AU shall be responsible
for conducting facility hazard analyses and other facility SSPP
functions as specified in the SOW. The AU shall be responsible
for securing the expertise necessary to perform the required
work and will have the same responsibilities as a prime
contractor in hazard identification, tracking, and resolution.
The AU shall assure that design subcontractors or consultants
maintain and provide suitable documentation of any safety
analyses performed.
TASK 103
SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM REVIEWS
103.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 103 is to establish a
requirement for the contractor to present system safety program
reviews, to periodically report the status of the system safety
program, and, when needed, to support special requirements such
as certifications and first flight readiness reviews.
103.2 Task Description. The contractor shall provide system
safety program reviews to periodically report to the MA the
status of hazard analyses, safety assessments, and other parts
of the system safety program. Also, when needed, the contractor
shall support presentations to Government certifying activities
such as munitions safety boards, nuclear safety boards, or
flight safety review boards. These may also include special
reviews such as first flight reviews or pre-construction
briefings.
103.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
103.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 103.
b. Identification of reviews, their content, and probable
location(s).
c. Method of documenting the results of system safety
reviews.
d. Schedule for system safety reviews.
e. Delivery schedule for any data required prior to and
after the reviews.
TASK 104
SYSTEM SAFETY GROUP/SYSTEM SAFETY WORKING GROUP SUPPORT
104.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 104 is to require
contractors to support system safety groups (Auk) and system
safety working groups (Auk) which are established in accordance
with service regulations or as otherwise defined by the MA.
104.2 Task Description. The contractor shall participate as an
active member of MA SSG/Auk. Such participation shall include
activities specified by the MA such as:
a. Presentation of the contractor safety program status,
including results of design or operations risk assessments.
b. Summaries of hazard analyses including identification
of problems and status or resolution.
c. Presentation of results of analyses of R&D mishaps and
hazardous malfunctions including recommendations and action
taken to prevent future recurrences.
d. Documentation and distribution of meeting agendas and
minutes.
e. Responding to action items assigned by the chairman of
the SSG/SSWG.
104.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
104.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW should include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 104.
(R) b. Contractor membership requirements and role
assignments, e.g., recorder, member, alternate, or
technical advisor.
(R) c. Frequency or total number of SSG/SSWG meetings and
probable locations.
d. Specific SSG/SSWG support tasks.
e. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 105
HAZARD TRACKING AND RISK RESOLUTION
105.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 105 is to establish a
single closed-loop hazard tracking system.
105.2 Task Description. The contractor shall develop a method
or procedure to document and track hazards from identification
until the hazard is eliminated or the associated risk is reduced
to a level acceptable to the MA, thus providing an audit trail
or hazard resolutions. A centralized file or document called a
"hazard log" shall be maintained. The hazard log shall contain
as a minimum:
a. Description of each hazard.
b. Status of each hazard.
c. Traceability of resolution action on each hazard from
the time the hazard was identified to the time the risk
associated with the hazard was reduced to a level
acceptable to the MA.
105.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
105.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 105.
(R) b. Hazard threshold for inclusion in the hazard log.
c. Complete set of data required on the hazard log,
including format.
d. Procedure by which hazards are entered into the log.
e. Procedure by which the contractor shall obtain close-
out or risk acceptance by the MA of each hazard.
f. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 106
TEST AND EVALUATION SAFETY
106.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 106 is to make sure safety
is considered in test and evaluation, to provide existing
analysis reports and other safety data, and to respond to all
safety requirements necessary for testing in-house, at other
contractor facilities, and at Government ranges, centers, or
laboratories.
106.2 Task Description. The contractor shall make sure the
contractor test and evaluation safety activities recommend
actions and evaluate actions taken to reduce or correct
CATASTROPHIC and CRITICAL hazards in the test and evaluation
environment. Specific test and evaluation safety activity tasks
shall include the following:
106.2.1 Test and Evaluation Planning. Planning for test and
evaluation safety from the beginning of the contract period to
consider the following:
a. Test program milestones requiring completion of hazard
analyses, risk assessments, or other safety studies.
b. Schedule for analysis, evaluation, and approval of test
plans, procedures, and other documents to make sure safety
is considered during all testing.
c. That test equipments, installation of test equipments,
and instrumentation are considered in hazard analyses prior
to test start.
d. Meeting specialized requirements designated by the MA
and informing the MA of any identified hazards that are
unique to the test environment.
106.2.2 Follow-up Actions. Initiating follow-up action to
insure completion of the corrective efforts taken to reduce or
correct test and evaluation hazards.
106.2.3 Reports. Maintaining a repository of test and
evaluation hazard/action status reports.
106.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
106.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 106.
(R) b. Designation of applicable specialized system safety
requirements for testing.
(R) c. Schedule for meeting requirements designated in 106.2
above.
d. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 107
SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRESS SUMMARY
107.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 107 is to provide a
periodic progress report summarizing the pertinent system safety
management and engineering activity that occurred during the
reporting period.
107.2 Task Description. The contractor shall provide a
periodic system safety progress report summarizing general
progress made relative to the system safety program during the
specified reporting period, and projected work for the next
reporting period. The report shall contain the following
information:
a. A brief summary of activities, progress, and status of
the safety effort in relation to the scheduled program
milestones. It shall highlight significant achievements
and problems. It shall include progress toward completion
of safety data prepared or in work.
b. Newly recognized significant hazards and significant
changes in the degree of control of the risk of known
hazards.
c. Status of all recommended corrective actions that have
not been implemented.
d. Significant cost and schedule changes that impact the
safety program.
e. Discussion of contractor documentation reviewed by
safety during the reporting period. Indicate whether the
documents were acceptable for safety content and whether or
not inputs to improve the safety posture were made.
f. Proposed agenda items for the next system safety group/
working group meeting, if such groups are formed.
107.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
107.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 107.
(R) b. Specification of progress reporting period.
c. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 108
QUALIFICATIONS OF KEY CONTRACTOR SYSTEM SAFETY ENGINEERS/MANAGERS
108.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 108 is to establish
qualifications for key contractor system safety engineers and
managers.
108.2 Task Description. The contractor shall assign and retain
qualified individuals as key system safety engineers and
managers. Key engineers and managers are those who possess
coordination or approval authority for contractor documentation.
108.2.1 Principal System Safety Engineer/Manager.
Qualifications of the principal system safety engineer or
manager shall consist of one of each of the options in each of
the following categories of education, training, and experience.
a. A minimum of a Bachelor of Science degree in
engineering, applied or general science, or safety or
business management.
b. Registration as a professional safety engineer in one
of the states of the United States, or certification by the
Board of Certified Safety Professionals in system safety.
c. Prior experience as a system safety engineer on a
full-time basis on products or systems for a minimum of
three (3) years during the preceding ten (10) years in at
least one of the following functional areas:
1. System Safety Management
2. System Safety Analysis
3. System Safety Design
4. System Safety Research
5. System Safety Operations
6. System Safety Administration
7. System or Equipment Mishap Investigation
8. Human Factors Engineering
9. Task Analysis
10. Product Assurance Engineering
11. Reliability Engineering
108.2.2 Other Safety Engineers/Managers. Qualifications for
other key safety engineers and managers shall be:
a. A minimum of a Bachelor of Science degree in
engineering, applied or general science, safety or business
management.
b. Prior degree related experience of two (2) years in a
non-safety field or one (1) year in safety.
108.2.3 Waiver for Not Meeting Qualifications. The contractor
shall submit a request for waiver if the principal system safety
engineer does not meet the above qualifications.
108.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
108.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 108.
b. Specification of other minimum qualifications.
TASK SECTION 200
DESIGN AND ENGINEERING
TASK 201
PRELIMINARY HAZARD LIST
201.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 201 is to compile a
preliminary hazard list (PHL) very early in the system
acquisition life cycle to enable the MA to choose any hazardous
areas on which to put management emphasis.
201.2 Task Description. The contractor shall examine the
system concept shortly after the concept definition effort
begins and compile a PHL identifying possible hazards that may
be inherent in the design. The contractor shall further
investigate selected hazards or hazardous characteristics
identified by the PHL as directed by the MA to determine their
significance.
201.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
201.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 201.
b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
c. Identification of special concerns.
TASK 202
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
202.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 202 is to perform and
document a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) to identify safety
critical areas, evaluate hazards, and identify the safety design
criteria to be used.
202.2 Task Description. The contractor shall perform and
document a preliminary hazard analysis to obtain an initial risk
assessment of a concept or system. The PHA effort shall be
started during the concept exploration phase or earliest life
cycle phases of the program so that safety considerations are
included in tradeoff studies and design alternatives. Based on
the best available data, including mishap data from similar
systems and other lessons learned, hazards associated with the
proposed design or function shall be evaluated for hazard
severity, hazard probability, and operational constraint.
Safety provisions and alternatives needed to eliminate hazards
or reduce their associated risk to a level acceptable to the MA
shall be considered. The PHA shall consider the following for
identification and evaluation of hazards as a minimum:
a. Hazardous components (e.g., fuels, propellants, lasers,
explosives, toxic substances, hazardous construction
materials, pressure systems, and other energy sources).
b. Safety related interface considerations among various
elements of the system (e.g., material compatibilities,
electromagnetic interference, inadvertent activation,
fire/explosive initiation and propagation, and hardware and
software controls). This shall include consideration of
the potential contribution by software (including software
developed by other contractors) to subsystem/system
mishaps. Safety design criteria to control safety-critical
software commands and responses (e.g., inadvertent command,
failure to command, untimely command or responses, or
MA-designated undesired events) shall be identified and
appropriate action taken to incorporate them in the
software (and related hardware) specifications.
c. Environmental constraints including the operating
environments (e.g., drop, shock, vibration, extreme
temperatures, noise, exposure to toxic substances, health
hazards, fire, electrostatic discharge, lightning,
electromagnetic environmental effects, ionizing and non-
ionizing radiation including laser radiation).
d. Operating, test, maintenance and emergency procedures
(e.g., human factors engineering, human error analysis of
operator functions, tasks, and requirements; effect of
factors such as equipment layout, lighting requirements,
potential exposures to toxic materials, effects of noise or
radiation on human performance; life support requirements
and their safety implications in manned systems, crash
safety, egress, rescue, survival, and salvage).
e. Facilities, support equipment (e.g., provisions for
storage, assembly, aec, prooftesting of hazardous systems/
assemblies which may include toxic, flammable, explosive,
corrosive or cryogenic fluids; radiation or noise emitters;
electrical power sources) and training (e.g. training and
certification pertaining to safety operations and
maintenance).
f. Safety related equipment, safeguards, and possible
alternate approaches (e.g., interlocks, system redundancy,
hardware or software fail safe design considerations,
subsystem protection, fire suppression systems, personal
protective equipment, industrial ventilation, and noise or
radiation barriers).
202.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
202.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 202.
b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required, including minimum hazard probability and severity
reporting thresholds.
c. Any selected hazards or hazardous areas to be
specifically examined or excluded.
TASK 203
SUBSYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS
203.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 203 is to perform and
document a subsystem hazard analysis (SSHA) to identify hazards
associated with design of subsystem including component failure
modes, critical human error inputs, and hazards resulting from
functional relationships between components and equipments
comprising each subsystem.
203.2 Task Description. The contractor shall perform and
document a subsystem hazard analysis to identify all components
and equipments, including software, whose performance,
performance degradation, functional failure, or inadvertent
functioning could result in a hazard or whose design does not
satisfy contractual safety requirements. The analysis shall
include a determination:
a. Of the modes of failure including reasonable human
errors as well as single point failures, and the effects on
safety when failures occur in subsystem components.
b. Of potential contribution of software (including that
which is developed by other contractors) events, faults,
and occurrences (such as improper timing) on the safety of
the subsystem.
c. That the safety design criteria in the software
specification(s) have been satisfied.
d. That the method of implementation of software design
requirements and corrective actions has not impaired or
decreased the safety of the subsystem nor has introduced
any new hazards.
If no specific analysis techniques are directed, the contractor
shall obtain MA approval of technique(s) to be used prior to
performing the analysis. When software to be used in conjunction
with the subsystem is being developed under DOD-STD-2167/2168, the
contractor performing the SSHA shall monitor, obtain and use the
output of each phase of the formal software development process in
evaluating the software contribution to the SSHA. Problems
identified which require the reaction of the software developer
shall be reported to the MA in time to support the ongoing phase of
the software development process. The contractor shall update the
SSHA when needed as a result of any system design changes,
including software design changes which affect system safety.
203.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
203.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 203.
(R) b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required including minimum hazard severity and probability
reporting thresholds.
c. The specific subsystem to be analyzed.
d. Specification of desired analysis technique(s) and/or
format.
TASK 204
SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS
204.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 204 is to perform and
document a system hazard analysis (SHA) to determine the safety
problem areas of the total system design including potential
safety critical human errors.
204.2 Task Description. The contractor shall perform and
document a system hazard analysis to identify hazards and assess
the risk of the total system design, including software, and
specifically of the subsystem interfaces. This analysis shall
include a review of subsystems interrelationships for:
a. Compliance with specified safety criteria.
b. Possible independent, dependent, and simultaneous
hazardous events including failures of safety devices and
common cause that could create a hazard.
c. Degradation in the safety of a subsystem or the total
system from normal operation of another subsystem.
d. Design changes that affect subsystems.
e. Effects of reasonable human errors.
f. Determination:
(1) Of potential contribution of software (including
that which is developed by other contractors) events,
faults and occurrences (such as improper timing) on
safety of the system.
(2) That the safety design criteria in the software
specification(s) have been satisfied.
(3) That the method of implementation of the software
design requirements and corrective actions has not
impaired or degraded the safety of the system nor has
introduced any new hazards.
If no specific analysis techniques are directed, the contractor
shall obtain MA approval of technique(s) to be used prior to
performing the analysis. The SHA may be performed using similar
techniques to those used for the SSHA. When software to be used
in conjunction with the system is being developed under
DOD-STD-2167/2168, the contractor performing the SHA shall
monitor, obtain, and use the output of each phase of the formal
software development process in evaluating the software
contribution to the SHA. Problems identified which require the
reaction of the software developer shall be reported to the MA in
time to support the ongoing phase of the software development
process. The contractor shall update the SHA when needed as a
result of any system design changes, including software design
changes which affect system safety.
204.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
204.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 204.
b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required including minimum hazard severity and probability
reporting thresholds.
c. Specification of desired analysis technique(s) and/or
format.
TASK 205
OPERATING AND SUPPORT HAZARD ANALYSIS
205.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 205 is to perform and
document an operating and support hazard analysis (O&SHA) to
identify hazards and recommend risk reduction alternatives
during all phases of intended system use.
205.2 Task Description. The contractor shall perform and
document an O&SHA to examine procedurally controlled activities.
The O&SHA identifies and evaluates hazards resulting from the
implementation of operations or tasks performed by persons,
considering: the planned system configuration/state at each
phase of activity; the facility interfaces; the planned
environments (or ranges thereof); the supporting tools or other
equipment, including software-controlled automatic test
equipment, specified for use; operational/task sequence,
concurrent task effects and limitations; biotechnological
factors, regulatory or contractually specified personnel safety
and health requirements; and the potential for unplanned events
including hazards introduced by human errors. The O&SHA must
identify the safety requirements (or alternatives) needed to
eliminate identified hazards, or to reduce the associated risk
to a level which is acceptable under either regulatory or
contractually specified criteria. The analysis shall identify:
a. Activities which occur under hazardous conditions,
their time periods, and the actions required to minimize
risk during these activities/time periods.
b. Changes needed in functional or design requirements for
system hardware/software, facilities, tooling, or support/
test equipment to eliminate hazards or reduce associated
risks.
c. Requirements for safety devices and equipment,
including personnel safety and life support equipment.
d. Warnings, cautions, and special emergency procedures
(e.g., egress, rescue, escape, render-safe, back-out,
etc.), including those necessitated by failure of a
software-controlled operation to produce the expected and
required safe result or indication.
e. Requirements for handling, storage, transportation,
maintenance, and disposal of hazardous materials.
f. Requirements for safety training and personnel
certification.
The O&SHA documents system safety assessment of procedures involved
in: system production, deployment, installation, assembly, test,
operation, maintenance, servicing, transportation, storage,
modification, demilitarization, and disposal. The contractor shall
update the O&SHA when needed as a result of any system design or
operational changes. If no specific analysis techniques are
directed, the contractor shall obtain MA approval of technique(s)
to be used prior to performing the analysis.
205.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
205.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 205.
(R) b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required, including minimum hazard probability and severity
reporting thresholds.
c. Specification of desired analysis technique(s) and/or
format.
TASK 206
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT
206.1 Purpose: The purpose of Task 206 is to perform and
document an occupational health hazard assessment (OHHA) to
identify health hazards and propose protective measures to
reduce the associated risk to a level acceptable to the MA.
206.2 Task Description
206.2.1 An OHHA shall be performed and documented to identify
health hazards and to recommend engineering controls, equipment,
and/or protective procedures, to reduce the associated risk to
a level acceptable to the MA. Specific occupational health
hazards and impacts that shall be considered include:
a. Toxic materials (e.g., carcinogens or suspected
carcinogens, systemic poisons, asphyxiants, and respiratory
irritants).
b. Physical agents (e.g., noise, heat or cold stress,
ionizing and non-ionizing radiation).
c. System, facility and personnel protective equipment
design requirements (e.g., ventilation, noise attenuation,
radiation barriers, etc.) to allow safe operation and
maintenance. When feasible engineering designs are not
available to reduce hazards to acceptable levels,
alternative protective measures must be specified (e.g.,
protective clothing, specific operation or maintenance
practices to reduce risk to an acceptable level).
206.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
206.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 206.
b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 207
SAFETY VERIFICATION
207.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 207 is to define and
perform tests and demonstrations or use other verification
methods on safety critical hardware, software, and procedures to
verify compliance with safety requirements.
207.2 Task Description. The contractor shall define and
perform tests, demonstrations, or otherwise verify the
compliance with safety and requirements on safety critical
(defined by the MA) hardware, software, and procedures. Induced
or simulated failures shall be considered to demonstrate the
failure mode and acceptability of safety critical equipment and
software. Where hazards are identified during the development
effort and it cannot be determined by analysis or inspection
whether the action taken will adequately reduce the risk, safety
tests shall be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the
actions taken. SSPPs and test program plans shall be revised to
include these tests. Where costs for safety testing would be
prohibitive, safety characteristics or procedures may be
verified by engineering analyses, analogy, laboratory test,
functional mockups, or subscale/model simulation, when approved
by the MA. Specific safety tests shall be integrated into
appropriate system test and demonstration plans to the maximum
extent possible. Test plans, test procedures, and results of all
tests including design verification, operational evaluation,
technical data validation and verification, production
acceptance, and shelf-life validation shall be reviewed to make
sure:
a. Safety of the design is adequately demonstrated
(including operating and maintenance procedures), including
verification of safety devices, warning devices, etc. for
all CATASTROPHIC hazards not eliminated by design.
b. Results of safety evaluations of the system are
included in the test and evaluation reports.
207.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
207.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 207.
(R) b. Definition of safety critical or identification of
safety critical equipment and procedures.
c. Development of or inputs to test plans, procedures and
reports to verify safety requirements.
d. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 208
TRAINING
208.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 208 is to provide training
for necessary certification of contractor and Government
personnel who will be involved with contractor activities in
such subjects as hazard types and their recognition, causes,
effects, and preventive and control measures; procedures,
checklists, and human error; safeguards, safety devices,
protective equipment; monitoring and warning devices; and
contingency procedures.
208.2 Task Description.
208.2.1 Training of Test, Operating, and Support Personnel.
The contractor shall conduct a system safety training program
for certification of test, operating and support personnel.
Approved safety procedures shall be included in instruction
lesson plans and student examination for the training of
engineering, technician, operating, and maintenance personnel.
Contractor test, operations, and field support personnel shall
be certified as having completed a training course in safety
principles and methods. Specific certification requirements
shall be established by a program certification board that
includes the system safety manager as a member.
208.2.2 Training of Personnel Involved in Design, Development,
and Production. The contractor shall develop safety training
programs using results of system and operating hazard analyses,
and shall provide for specific types and levels of contractor
personnel: i.e., managers, engineers, and technicians involved
in design, product assurance, test, and production.
208.2.3 Training of Government Personnel. Contractor safety
training shall also include Government personnel who will be
involved in contractor activities.
208.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
208.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 208.
b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 209
SAFETY ASSESSMENT
209.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 209 is to perform and
document a comprehensive evaluation of the mishap risk being
assumed prior to test or operation of a system or at contract
completion.
209.2 Task Description. The contractor shall perform and
document a safety assessment to identify all safety features of
the hardware, software, and system design and to identify
procedural hazards that may be present in the system being
acquired including specific procedural controls and precautions
that should be followed. The safety assessment shall summarize:
a. The safety criteria and methodology used to classify
and rank hazards.
b. The analyses and tests performed to identify hazards
inherent in the system, including:
1. Those hazards that still have a residual risk, and
the actions that have been taken to reduce the
associated risk to a level contractually specified as
acceptable.
2. Results of tests conducted to validate safety
criteria requirements and analyses.
c. The results of the safety program efforts. Include a
list of all significant hazards along with specific safety
recommendations or precautions required to ensure safety of
personnel and property. Categorize the list of hazards as
to whether or not they may be expected under normal or
abnormal operating conditions.
d. Any hazardous materials generated by or used in the
system, including:
1. Identification of material type, quantity, and
potential hazards.
2. Safety precautions and procedures necessary during
use, storage, transportation, and disposal. Include
all explosives hazard classification data developed in
accordance with Explosives Hazard Classification
Procedures.
3. A copy of the Material Safety Data Sheet (OSHA Form
20 or DD Form 1813).
e. Conclude with a signed statement that all identified
hazards have been eliminated or their associated risks
controlled to levels contractually specified as acceptable,
and that the system is ready to test or operate or proceed
to the next acquisition phase. In addition, the contractor
shall make recommendations applicable to hazards at the
interface of his system with the other system(s) as
contractually required.
209.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
209.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 209.
b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 210
SAFETY COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT
210.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 210 is to perform and
document a safety compliance assessment to verify compliance
with military, federal, national, and industry codes imposed
contractually or by law to ensure safe design of a system, and
to comprehensively evaluate the safety risk being assumed prior
to test or operation of a system or at contract completion.
210.2 Task Description. The contractor shall perform and
document a safety compliance assessment to identify and document
compliance with appropriate design and operational safety and
requirements. The assessment identifies the contractually
imposed standards, specifications, and codes appropriate to the
safety of the system and documents compliance with these
requirements. The assessment includes necessary hazard
analysis, design drawing and procedural reviews, and equipment
inspections. The assessment shall incorporate the scope and
techniques of PHA, SSHA, SHA, and O&SHA to the extent necessary
to assure the safe design, operation, maintenance, and support
of the system. A safety compliance assessment shall:
a. Identify contractual military, federal, national, and
industry safety specifications, standards, and codes
applicable to the system and document compliance of the
design and procedures with these requirements.
b. Identify and evaluate residual hazards inherent in the
system or that arise from system-unique interfaces,
installation, test, operation, maintenance, or support.
c. Identify necessary specialized safety design features,
devices, procedures, skills, training, facilities, support
requirements, and personnel protective equipment.
d. Identify hazardous materials and the precautions and
procedures necessary for safe storage, handling, transport,
use, and disposal of the material.
210.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
210.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 210.
b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 211
SAFETY REVIEW OF ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSALS AND REQUESTS FOR
DEVIATION/WAIVER
211.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 211 is to perform and
document analyses of engineering change proposals (ECPs) and
requests for deviation/waiver to determine the safety impact on
the system.
211.2 Task Description.
211.2.1 ECP Evaluations. The contractor shall analyze each ECP
to determine the hazards associated with it, assess the
associated risk, and predict the safety impact of the ECP on the
existing system. The basis for determining that no hazards are
introduced by the ECP must be explained and any necessary
supporting evidence included in the evaluation documentation.
When an ECP is determined to decrease the level of safety of the
existing system, the MA must be so notified.
211.2.2 Requests for Deviation/Waiver. The contractor shall
analyze each request for deviation/waiver to determine the
hazards and assess the risk of the proposed deviation from or
waiver of a requirement, or a specified method or process. The
change in the risk involved in accepting the deviation or waiver
shall be identified. When the level of safety of the system
will be reduced by deviation from or waiver of the requirement,
method, or process, the MA must be so notified.
211.3. Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
211.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 211.
b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 212
RESERVED
For Software Hazard Analyses see the 300 series tasks.
TASK 213
GFE/GFP SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS
213.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 213 is to make sure system
safety analyses for GFE/GFP are considered for integration into
the system.
213.2 Task Description. The contractor shall identify the
safety critical performance and design data needed to
incorporate the GFE/GFP items.
213.2.1 If the data is available and is to be supplied by the
MA, the contractor shall:
a. Identify the system safety analyses that are needed,
and when these analyses are needed.
b. Identify to the MA any additional system safety
analyses that are needed for interfaces between the GFE/GFP
and the rest of the system.
c. Perform the analysis upon receipt of MA approval to do
so.
213.2.2 If no previously performed analysis data is available,
the contractor shall:
a. Develop and submit to the MA a proposed method for
determining needed safety-critical data by analysis, test,
and/or inspection.
b. Implement the approved method upon receipt of MA
approval to do so.
213.3 Details to be Specified by the MA (Reference 1.3.2.1).
213.3.1 Details to be specified in the SOW shall include the
following, as applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100 and 213.
(R) b. Definition of safety critical.
c. Format, content, and delivery schedule for any data
required including minimum hazard severity and probability
reporting thresholds.
TASK SECTION 300
SOFTWARE SYSTEM SAFETY
300. Software System Safety.
300.1 Software System Safety is an integral part of the total
System Safety Program. The 300 series of tasks are to be used
in concert with the following documents;
a. DOD-STD-2167, Defense System Software Development,
b. DOD-STD-2168, Software Quality Evaluation.
c. MIL-STD-e, Configuration Management Practices for
Systems, Equipment, Munitions, and Computer Programs,
d. MIL-STD-1521B, Reviews and Audits for Systems,
Equipment, and Computer Programs
e. DOD-HDBK-287, Defense System Software Development
Handbook,
These documents should also be referenced for definitions unique
to software development.
300.2 The 300 series of tasks are recommended for programs
which involve large or complicated software packages normally
developed under the above documents. For other programs, for
which these tasks are not appropriate, the software can be
considered within selected 200 series tasks.
TASK 301
SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS HAZARD ANALYSIS
301.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 301 is to require the
contractor to perform and document a Software Requirements
Hazard Analysis (SRHA). The contractor shall examine system and
software requirements and design in order to identify unsafe
modes for resolution, such as out-of-sequence, wrong event,
inappropriate magnitude, inadvertent command, adverse
environment, deadlocking, failure-to-command modes, etc.
As input, the SRHA uses the PHL (Task 201) and system level PHA
(Task 202). The analysis shall examine Safety-Critical Computer
Software Components (SCCSC) at a gross level to obtain an initial
safety evaluation of the software system. The output of the SRHA
is used as input to other safety analyses. SCCSCs shall be subject
to further analysis by the Top-Level and Detailed Design analyses.
A draft SCCSC shall be presented at the System Requirements Review,
and updated at the System Design Review. The final results of the
analysis shall be presented at the Software Specifications Review.
301.2 Task Description:
301.2.1 Safety Requirement Tracking. The contractor shall
develop a tracking system within the configuration management
structure for software safety requirements and their flow
through the documentation. A description of the implementation
of each requirement is desirable.
301.2.2 Analyze Software Requirements Specifications. The
contractor shall analyze the System/Segment Specification
(SEAWAYS) and Software Requirements Specification (SRS), to
include the following sub-tasks;
a. Review Specification Documents. The contractor shall
assure that the System Safety Requirements are correctly
and completely specified, that they have been properly
translated in to software requirements, and that the
software safety requirements will appropriately influence
the software design and the development of the operator,
user, and diagnostic manuals. To do this the contractor
shall review, as a minimum, the following documents:
(1) System/Segment Specification and Subsystem
Specifications
(2) Software Requirements Specifications
(3) Interface Requirements Specifications and other
interface documents
(4) Functional Flow Diagrams and related data
(5) Storage allocation and program structure documents
(6) Background information relating to safety
requirements associated with the contemplated testing,
manufacturing, storage, repair, use, and final
disposition.
(7) Information concerning system energy, toxic and
other hazardous event sources, especially ones which
may be controlled directly or indirectly by software
(e.g., System PHA)
(8) Software Development Plan, Software Quality
Evaluation Plan, and Software Configuration Management
Plan
(9) Historical data
b. Identify Hazards Related to Specifications. The
contractor shall identify hazards related to any of the
specifications or documents listed above.
301.2.3 Develop Recommendations, Design and Testing
Requirements. The contractor shall develop safety related
recommendations, and design and testing requirements and shall
incorporate them in the Software Top-Level and Software Detailed
Design Documents, and the Software Test Plan. The following
subtasks shall be accomplished:
a. Develop Specification Change Recommendations. The
contractor shall develop safety-related change
recommendations to the specification documents listed
above, including means of verification.
b. Develop Design Requirements. The contractor shall
develop safety related design requirements for
incorporation into the Software Top-Level Design Document
and Software Detailed Design Document. In addition,
safety-related recommendations regarding hardware design or
selection shall also be made.
c. Develop Testing Requirements. The contractor shall
develop safety related test plans, test descriptions, test
procedures, and test case requirements for incorporation
into the corresponding test documents.
301.2.4 Support the System Design Review and Software
Specification Review. The contractor shall support the System
Design Review (SDR) and Software Specification Review (SURE)
from a software safety viewpoint.
301.3 Details to be specified by the Managing Agency: Details
to be specified in the SOW shall include the following, as
applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100, 201, 202, and 301.
(R) b. Definition of Safety Critical within the context of the
system, subsystem, or component under analysis.
(R) c. Level of contractor support required for design
reviews.
d. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 302
TOP-LEVEL DESIGN HAZARD ANALYSIS
302.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 302 is to require the
contractor to perform and document a Top-Level Design Hazard
Analysis (TDHA). The contractor shall analyze the Top-Level
Design, using the results of the SRHA (Task 301), if previously
accomplished.
This hazard analysis shall include: the definition and subsequent
analysis of Safety-Critical Computer Software Components (SCCSC),
identifying the degree of risk involved, and the design and test
plan to be implemented. The TDHA shall be substantially complete
before the Software Detailed Design is started. The results of the
TDHA shall be presented at the Preliminary Design Review.
302.2 Task Description:
302.2.1 Conduct a Hazard Risk Assessment. The contractor shall
perform a safety hazard risk assessment to identify those SCCSs
that warrant further analysis beyond the preliminary design
level.
a. Relate Hazards to Software Elements. The contractor
shall relate identified hazards from the PHA, SSHA, and
SRHA to the Computer Software Components (CSCs) and
lower-level software units which may affect or control the
hazards. These software components, and any others which
may be specifically designated, are the SCCSCs.
b. Evaluate Independence/Dependence and Interdependence in
Top-level Design. The contractor shall evaluate available
design documentation to determine the independence/
dependence and interdependence of SCCSCs to both safety-
critical and non-safety-critical CSCs. Those CSCs which are
found to affect the output of SCCSCs are also SCCSCs.
302.2.2 Analyze Top-level Design. The contractor shall analyze
the Top-Level Design of those SCCSs identified above to ensure
that all safety requirements are correctly and completely
specified in the Top-Level design. The contractor shall
determine where in the Top-Level Design, and under what
conditions, unacceptable hazards may occur. Input/output
timing, multiple event, out-of-sequence event, failure of event,
wrong event, inappropriate magnitude, adverse environmental,
deadlocking, hardware failure sensitivities, etc., shall be
included in the analysis.
302.2.3 Develop Design Change Recommendations. Based on the
results of the PHA, SSHA, SRHA, and TDHA, the contractor shall
make changes to the Software Top-Level Design Document to
eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the risk of the
hazards.
302.2.4 Integrate Safety Requirements Into the Software Test
Plan. The contractor shall integrate safety requirements and
include the testing of safety-critical CSCs and conditions in
the Software Test Plan. The contractor shall incorporate
safety-specific tests in the Software Test Plan, the System Test
Plan, and the overall system testing program. These test plans
shall contain provisions for testing under both simulated and
operational conditions.
302.2.5 Support Preliminary Design Review. The contractor shall
support the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) from a software
safety viewpoint.
302.3 Details to be specified by the Managing Agency: Details
to be specified in the SOW shall include the following, as
applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100, 203, 301, and 302.
(R) b. Definition of Safety Critical within the context of the
system, subsystem, or component under analysis.
(R) c. Level of contractor support required for design reviews.
d. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 303
DETAILED DESIGN HAZARD ANALYSIS
303.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 303 is to require the
contractor to perform and document a Detailed Design Hazard
Analysis (DDHA). The contractor shall analyze the Software
Detailed Design, using the results of the SRHA (Task 301) and
TDHA (Task 302) (if previously accomplished) to verify the
correct incorporation of safety requirements and to analyze the
Safety-Critical Computer Software Components (SCCSCs). This
analysis shall be substantially complete before coding of the
software is started. The results of the DDHA shall be presented
at the Critical Design Review.
303.2 Task Description:
303.2.1 Hazard Risk Assessment. The contractor shall perform
a hazard risk assessment to determine which software elements
warrant further analysis.
a. Relate Hazards to Software Components. The contractor
shall relate hazards identified from the PHA, SRHA, and
TDHA to lower level software components defined in the
Software Detailed Design. These components shall be
identified as SCCSCs and shall be designated as
configuration items in accordance with DOD-STD-2167 and
MIL-STD-483 (or DOD-STD-2168). Identification of SCCSCs
shall be carried to the lowest level practical through
analysis of the Detailed Design.
b. Evaluate Independence/Dependence and Interdependence in
Detailed Design. The contractor shall evaluate the Software
Detailed Design Document and other Detailed Design
documentation to determine the independence/dependence and
interdependence of safety-critical and other designated
software at the Computer Software Configuration Item
(CSCI), Computer Software Component (CSC) and lower unit
levels, (including subroutines, data bases, data files,
tables, and variables).
303.2.2 Analyze Detailed Design. The contractor shall conduct
a safety analysis on the Software Detailed Design, of software
components identified as safety-critical by the hazard risk
assessments, to ensure that all safety requirements are
correctly and completely specified and included in the design.
The contractor shall determine where in the detailed design, and
under what conditions, unacceptable hazards will or may occur.
Potential errors attributable to input/output timing, multiple
event, out-of-sequence event, failure of event, wrong event,
inappropriate magnitude, adverse environment, deadlocking, and
hardware failure sensitivities shall be included in the analysis.
303.2.3 Develop Design Recommendations. Based on the results
of the Detailed Design Safety Analyses, the contractor shall
make change recommendations to the detailed design to eliminate
or reduce the severity of the hazards to an acceptable level.
The precedence for resolving hazards shall be in accordance with
Paragraph 4.4 of this Standard.
303.2.4 Develop Test Requirements. The contractor shall
participate in the continuing development of changes and
requirements to test plans, descriptions, and procedures. The
contractor shall develop test descriptions and procedures for
SCCSCs.
303.2.5 Develop User, Operator and Diagnostic Manual
Requirements. The contractor shall develop safety-related
information (e.g., Caution and Warning Notes) for inclusion in
the Computer System Diagnostic, Computer System Operator,
Firmware Support, and Software User's Manuals, and in other
manuals as appropriate.
303.2.6 Identify Safety-Critical Computer Software Components
to Code Developers. The contractor shall identify safety-
critical computer software units to the code developers, and
provide them with explicit safety-related coding recommendations
and safety requirements from the top-level specifications and
design documents.
303.2.7 Support Critical Design Review. The contractor shall
support the Critical Design Review (CDR) from a software safety
viewpoint. The contractor shall report the results of the
Software Safety Analyses at CDR. The presentation shall include
top-level design safety requirements and their implementation,
supporting analyses and the methodology used, and any unresolved
hazards or issues.
303.3 Details to be specified by the Managing Agency: Details
to be specified in the SOW shall include the following, as
applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100, 204, 301, 302, and 303.
(R) b. Definition of Safety Critical within the context of the
system, subsystem, or component under analysis.
(R) c. Level of contractor support required for design
reviews.
d. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 304
CODE-LEVEL SOFTWARE HAZARD ANALYSIS
304.1 Purpose: The purpose of Task 304 is to require the
contractor to perform and document a Code-Level Software Hazard
Analysis (CSHA). Using the results of the DDHA (Task 303), if
previously accomplished, the contractor shall analyze program
code and system interfaces for events, faults, and conditions
which could cause or contribute to undesired events affecting
safety. This analysis shall start when coding begins, and shall
continue throughout the system life cycle.
304.2 Task Description:
304.2.1 Component Analysis. The contractor shall perform a
hazard analysis of all safety-critical computer software
components, to include the following subtasks:
a. Analyze:
(1) Safety-Critical Computer Software Components for
correctness and completeness, and for input-output
timing, multiple event, out-of-sequence event, failure
of event, adverse environment, deadlocking, wrong
event, inappropriate magnitude, hardware failure
sensitivities, etc.
(2) Software implementation of safety criteria called
out in the system specifications and requirements
documents.
(3) Possible combinations of hardware failures,
software failures, transient errors, and other events
that could cause the system to operate in a hazardous
manner.
(4) Proper error default handling for special
characters or inappropriate or unexpected data in the
input data stream.
(5) Fail-safe and fail-soft modes.
(6) Input overload or out-of-bound conditions.
b. Perform a Process Flow Analysis. Perform an internal
path and control process flow analysis on safety-critical
computer software components.
c. Propose Change Recommendations. Propose design,
coding, and testing change recommendations in the
specification, design, and test documents to the
Government.
d. Support Informal Reviews. Support informal reviews of
each safety-critical computer software component.
304.2.2 Review Code Documentation. The contractor shall ensure
all safety-critical computer software components and all source
code are thoroughly and accurately documented and commented in
such a way that future changes by programmers unfamiliar with
the original code can be made with a reduced chance of
introducing new software safety hazards.
304.2.3 Support the Test Readiness Review. The contractor
shall support the Test Readiness Review (TRR) from a software
safety viewpoint.
304.3 Details to be specified by the Managing Agency: Details
to be specified in the SOW shall include the following, as
applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100, 204, 301, 303, and 304.
(R) b. Definition of Safety Critical within the context of the
system, subsystem, or component under analysis.
(R) c. Level of contractor support required for design
reviews.
d. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 305
SOFTWARE SAFETY TESTING
305.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 305 is to require the
contractor to perform and document Software Safety Testing.
305.2 Task Description: The contractor shall test the software
to ensure that all hazards have been eliminated or controlled to
an acceptable level of risk. The contractor shall include the
following in the testing of the software and system: safety-
related test descriptions, procedures, and cases, and the
associated qualification criteria. Implementation of safety
requirements (inhibits, traps, interlocks, assertions, etc.)
shall be verified. The contractor shall verify that the
software functions safely both within its specified environment,
and under abnormal conditions. The following subtasks shall be
included:
305.2.1 Component, Integration, Acceptance, and System Testing.
The contractor shall participate in the testing of safety-
critical computer software components at all levels of testing,
including informal testing, system integration testing, and
Software Acceptance testing.
a. Enforce Test Discipline. The contractor software
safety personnel shall ensure that tests of safety-critical
components are conducted in strict accordance with the
approved test plans, descriptions, procedures, and cases,
and that the results are accurately logged, recorded,
documented, analyzed, and reported. The contractor shall
ensure that deficiencies and discrepancies are corrected
and retested.
b. Support Abnormal Condition Testing. In addition to
testing under normal conditions, the software shall be
tested to show that unsafe states cannot be generated by
the software as the result of feasible single or multiple
erroneous inputs. This shall include those outputs which
might result from failures associated with the entry into,
and execution of, safety-critical computer software
components. Negative and No-Go testing shall also be
employed, and the contractor shall assure that the software
only performs those functions for which it is intended,
and no extraneous functions.
c. System Integration and Acceptance Testing. The
contractor shall ensure that the software performs properly
and safely during system integration stress testing, and
system acceptance testing. System acceptance testing shall
be conducted under actual operating conditions.
305.2.2 Commercial Software. Commercial software included in
the system shall be analyzed and tested unless specifically
excluded by the Managing Agency. Commercial software includes
commercially developed, commercially acquired, proprietary, and
other software not specifically developed for the system. These
analyses and tests shall be performed whether this software is
modified or not.
305.2.3 Government Furnished Software. The contractor shall
subject any Government Furnished software (unless specifically
excluded by the Managing Agency), whether modified by the
contractor or not, to the same software safety analysis and
testing requirements as the software that was developed under
the contract which invokes this task.
305.2.4 Hazard Correction. The contractor shall correct the
software to eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level of risk
any safety hazards discovered during system integration testing
or acceptance testing. The corrected software shall be retested
under identical conditions to ensure that these hazards have
been eliminated, and that other hazards do not occur.
305.3 Details to be specified by the Managing Agency: Details
to be specified in the SOW shall include the following, as
applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100, 301, and 305.
(R) b. Definition of Safety Critical within the context of the
system, subsystem, or component under analysis.
(R) c. Level of contractor support required for design
reviews.
d. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 306
SOFTWARE/USER INTERFACE ANALYSIS
306.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 306 is to require the
contractor to perform and document a Software/User Interface
Analysis and the development of Software Users Procedures.
306.2 Task Description:
306.2.1 The system and its software shall be designed in
accordance with the system safety precedence listed in Paragraph
4.4 of this Standard. Identified hazards not eliminated or
controlled by the system design and implementation shall be
analyzed and design change recommendations made (with
corresponding operator procedures) that:
(a) Provide for the detection of a hazard condition.
(b) Provide for a safe survival and recovery methodology
from a detected critical hazard condition.
(c) Incorporate an operator warning feature to alert the
operator/pilot of software errors that results in
non-conformance or equipment malfunctions (e.g., "X
function unavailable").
(d) Provide for safe cancellation of processing or of an
event.
(e) Provide for the unambiguous and complete display of the
status of safety-critical systems or components. Overrides
of overridable potential safety critical faults or clearing
of the status data should not be permitted until all of the
data has been displayed. (e.g., a system has a series of
faults that my be safety overridden if they occur singly.
However, multiple faults could result in loss of the
aircraft or system. The pilot or operator should be made
aware of all safety critical faults prior to issuing an
override command or resetting a status display.)
306.3 Details to be specified by the Managing Agency: Details
to be specified in the SOW shall include the following, as
applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100, 301, and 306.
b. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
TASK 307
SOFTWARE CHANGE HAZARD ANALYSIS
307.1 Purpose. The purpose of Task 307 is to require the
contractor to perform and document the Software Change Hazard
Analysis.
307.2 Task Description: The contractor shall analyze all
changes, modifications, and patches made to the software for
safety hazards, to include the following:
307.2.1 Perform Software Hazard Analysis. All changes to
specifications, requirements, design, code, systems, equipment,
and test plans, descriptions, procedures, cases, or criteria
shall be subjected to software hazard analysis and testing,
unless it can be shown to be unnecessary due to the nature of
the change. The beginning point of this change hazard analysis
shall be the highest level within the documentation or system
that is affected by the change being proposed.
307.2.2 Resolution of Safety Considerations. The contractor
shall show that the change or patch does not create a hazard,
does not impact on a hazard that has previously been resolved,
does not make a currently existing hazard more severe, and does
not adversely affect any safety-critical computer software
component or related and interfacing code.
307.2.3 Updating Documentation. The contractor shall review
the affected documentation, and ensure that it correctly
reflects all safety-related changes that have been made in the
software.
307.2.4 Software Configuration Management Plan. The contractor
shall include the methods, procedures, and other information on
how this task will be performed in the Software Configuration
Management Plan.
307.3 Details to be specified by the Managing Agency: Details
to be specified in the SOW shall include the following, as
applicable:
(R) a. Imposition of Tasks 100, 301, and 307.
(R) b. Definition of Safety Critical within the context of the
system, subsystem, or component under analysis.
c. Format, content, and delivery schedule of any data
required.
NOTICE 1
(NOTE: Pages A1 - A4 are missing. Refer to hardcopy. The
following text begins page A-5.)
action. A hazard risk index of ID, 2C, 2D, 3B, or 3C would be
tracked for possible corrective action. A hazard risk index of
1E, 2E, 3D, or 3E might have a lower priority for corrective
action and may not warrant any tracking actions. In the second
matrix, risk indices of 1 through 20 (1 being highest risk) are
assigned somewhat arbitrarily. This matrix design assigns a
different index to each frequency-category pair thus avoiding the
situation caused by creating indices as products of numbers
assigned to frequency and category which causes common results
such as 2 X 6 - 3 X 4 - 4 X 3. This situation hides information
pertinent to prioritization. These are only examples of a risk
assessment methods and do not fit all programs.
307.4 Action on Identified Hazards (Reference paragraph
4.6). The contractor is required to follow the system safety
precedence to resolve CATASTROPHIC and CRITICAL hazards, and
guard against MARGINAL hazards.
40. TASK SELECTION
40.1 Selection Criteria
40.1.1 A major challenge which confronts all Government and
industry organizations responsible for a system safety program
is the selection of tasks which can materially aid in attaining
program safety requirements. Schedule and funding constraints
mandate a cost-effective selection, one that is based on
identified program needs. The considerations presented herein
are intended to provide guidance and rationale for this
selection. They are also intended to jog the memory for lessons
learned to provoke questions which must be answered and to
encourage dialogue with other engineers, and operations and
support personnel so that answers to questions and solutions to
problems can be found.
40.1.2 Once appropriate tasks have been selected, the tasks
themselves must be tailored and specified as outlined in the
"Details To Be Specified By the MA." It is also important to
coordinate task requirements with other engineering support
groups, such as logistics support, reliability, etc., to
eliminate duplication of tasks and to be aware of any additional
information of value to system safety which these other groups
can provide. Finally, the timing and depth required for each
task, as well as action to be taken based on task outcome, are
largely dependent on individual experience and program
requirements. For these reasons, hard and fast rules are not
stated.
40.2 Application Matrix for Program Phases. Tables I
and II herein provide general guidance on task selection to
establish an acceptable and cost effective system safety
program. These tables can be used to initially identify those
tasks which typically are included in an effective system safety
program for the particular acquisition phase involved. The user
of the document can then refer to the particular task referenced
by the matrix and determine from the detailed purpose at the
beginning of the task if it is appropriate to identify as a
program task. The use of this matrix for developing a system
safety program is to be considered as optional guidance only and
is not to be construed as covering all procurement situations.
The provisions of applicable regulations must also be followed.
TABLE 1. APPLICATION MATRIX FOR SYSTEM PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 2. APPLICATION MATRIX FOR FACILITIES ACQUISITION
40.3 Task Prioritization. The problem of prioritizing
or establishing a baseline group from all the tasks in this
document cannot be solved unless variables like system
complexity, program phase, availability of funds, schedule,
etc., are known. Task 100, System Safety Program, is required,
and tailoring should be based on total program cost and
complexity. All other tasks require Task 100 as a prerequisite.
40.3.1 Identifying and Quantifying System Safety Needs. The
elements of a system safety program must be selected to meet the
safety needs. These needs are identified by higher authority
through directives and other documents. Identifying and
quantifying these needs must be accomplished prior to the
appropriate acquisition phase so that tasks and requirements
commensurate with the needs may be included. The tasks and
requirements which are included establish the framework for the
continuing system safety dialogue between the MA and the
proposing contractors, one or more of whom will ultimately be
selected to develop the system.
40.3.2 Selecting Tasks to Fit the Needs. In most cases, the
need for the tasks is self-evident. While experience plays a
key role in task selection, it should be supplemented by
analysis and investigation. Once recommendations for task
applications have been determined and more detailed equipment
requirements identified, tasks and requirements can be
prioritized and a "rough order of magnitude" estimate should be
made of the time and effort required to complete each task.
This information will be of considerable value in selecting the
tasks which can be accomplished within schedule and funding
constraints.
50. RATIONALE AND GUIDANCE FOR TASK SELECTIONS.
50.1 Task Section 100 - Program Management and Control.
50.1.1 System Safety Program (Task 100). This task is required
if MIL-STD-882B is to be imposed. Task 100 requires the
contractor to set up and conduct a system safety program to meet
the requirements of Section 4. Because of the general nature of
Section 4, careful tailoring of the requirements contained
therein is necessary for each program, particularly for
relatively small efforts.
50.1.2 System Safety Program Plan (Task 101).
50.1.2.1 The system safety program plan is a basic tool used by
the MA to assist in managing an effective system safety program.
It can be used to evaluate the various contractors' approaches
to, understanding of, and execution of their system safety tasks,
their depth of planning to make sure their procedures for
implementing and controlling system safety tasks are adequate,
and their organizational structure to make sure appropriate
attention will be focused on system safety activities.
50.1.2.2 An SSPP is normally prepared by the contractor and
when approved by the MA, becomes the basis of understanding
between the contractor and the MA as to how the system safety
program is to be conducted. The SSPP identifies all safety
program activities specified by the MA and shows how
the safety program will provide input or preclude duplication of
effort. The plan provides specific information to show how the
contractor will meet quantitative and/or qualitative safety
requirements during development, production, and construction
phases. When prepared in response to a request for proposal,
the SSPP serves as a thorough cross-index to the safety
management and engineering proposals contained in the
contractor's response. This plan must clearly reflect the
safety features of the response. On small programs, or large
programs with several associate contractors where the MA is the
integrator, or where the MA has a firm idea of the type and
magnitude of the system safety effort required, the MA may
prepare the SSPP and attach it to the SOW. This often will save
funds since the MA would not need to buy the plan from the
contractor, and also informs the contractor just what is
expected. Not only does this allow contractors to price the
effort in their bids, it eliminates the possibility of entering
into rounds of submittal/disapproval/resubmittal by contractors
inexperienced in system safety. However, if the contractor does
not prepare an SSPP, other than in the proposal itself, the MA
obtains no immediate information as to whether the contractor
understands the system safety requirements.
50.1.2.3 The format and instructions for preparing an SSPP are
specified in Task 101 and DoD Authorized Data Item
DI-SAFT-80100, System Safety Program Plan. This data item must
be tailored for each program by requiring certain paragraphs to
be listed on the contract data requirements list, DD Form 1423.
Preliminary SSPPs are often required to be submitted with the
contractor's proposal. This allows for the proposed system
safety effort to be considered during source selection.
Additionally, if the scope of the effort is too large or small,
or misdirected, it provides time to get the contractor to
correct the error prior to contract initiation.
50.1.3 Integration/Management of Associate Contractors,
Subcontractors and Architect and Engineering Firms (Task 102).
Major programs or construction projects will often have multiple
associate contractors, integrating contractors, and AE firms
under contract. An integrating contractor or a facilities
acquisition contractor will often have the responsibility to
oversee system safety efforts of associate contractors or AE
firms. Task 102 provides the authority for management
surveillance needed by the integrating or facilities acquisition
contractor by assigning the various system safety roles of
associate contractors, subcontractors, integrators, and
construction firms. The integrator should be tasked to write an
ISSPP according to the requirements outlined in Task 101. The
integrator and construction contractor should be tasked to
perform system hazard analyses and assessments to cover the
interfaces between the various contractors' portions of the
system or construction effort. All contractors and AE firms
should be made aware of the integrator's or facilities
acquisition contractor's role of overall system safety
management. The integrator needs to resolve differences between
associates in safety-related areas. The MA will aid the
integrator in these efforts to make sure all contractors and
firms mutually understand the system safety requirements, and
their respective responsibilities to comply with them.
50.1.4 System Safety Program Reviews (Task 103).
50.1.4.1 In addition to the system safety reviews required by
other DoD or service regulations and MIL-STDs (at milestone
design reviews and audits), the MA may require special safety
reviews. Early in a major program, system safety reviews should
be held at least quarterly and as the program progresses, time
between reviews can be extended. In addition to more detailed
coverage of those items discussed at milestone design reviews,
the reviews should address progress on all system safety tasks
specified in the SOW.
50.1.4.2 Special system safety reviews may be needed to fulfill
requirements of munitions safety boards, first flight readiness
reviews, and other safety certification authorities. These
reviews should be specified in the SOW as part of Task 103.
50.1.4.3 All program reviews provide an opportunity to review
and assign action items and to explore other areas of concern.
A mutually acceptable agenda should be written to make sure all
system safety open items are covered and that all participants
are prepared for meaningful discussions.
50.1.5 System Safety Group/System Safety Working Group Support
(Task 104). Individual service regulations require formation of
SSG/SSWGs for acquisition of expensive, complex or critical
systems, equipment or major facilities. Contractor support of
an SSG/SSWG is very useful and may be necessary to make sure
procured hardware or software is acceptably free from hazards
that could injure personnel or cause unnecessary damage or loss.
The level of support desired from the contractor must be detailed
in the contract through imposition of Task 104.
50.1.6 Hazard Tracking and Risk Resolution (Task 105). A
method or procedure must be developed to document and track
hazards and progress made toward resolution of the associated
risk. Each prime or associate contractor may maintain their own
hazard log or assessment report, or the integrator or MA will
maintain the document. If the contractor is to maintain the
log, Task 105 must be imposed. Each hazard that meets or
exceeds the threshold specified by the MA should be entered on
the log when first identified, and each action taken to
eliminate the hazard or reduce the associated risk thoroughly
documented. The MA will detail the procedure for closing-out
the hazard, or acceptance of any residual risk. The hazard log
may be documented and delivered as part of the system safety
progress summary using DI-SAFT-80105, System Safety Engineering
Report, or it can be included as part of an overall program
engineering/management report.
50.1.7 Test and Evaluation Safety (Task 106). This task
provides needed contractor management activities to make sure
all test safety requirements are met prior to and during
testing. Early planning for test and evaluation must be done to
consider testing milestones that will require certain hazard
analyses, range or laboratory requirements that may require
specially formatted assessments, review of test documents, etc.
50.1.8 System Safety Progress Summary (Task 107). The system
safety progress summary provides a periodic written report of
the status of system safety engineering and management
activities. This status report may be submitted monthly or
quarterly. It can be formatted and delivered according to
DI-SAFT-80105, System Safety Engineering Report, or it can be
included as part of an overall program engineering/management
report.
50.1.9 Qualifications of Key Contractor System Safety
Engineers/Managers (Task 108). Some programs will require that
the key system safety engineers and managers possess special
qualifications. Some or all qualifications listed in Task 108
may be required, or the MA may specify other minimum
qualifications. Care must be exercised in applying Task 108 to
assure some opportunity for growth and qualification of neophyte
system safety personnel who possess little experience.
50.2 Task Section 200 - Design and Evaluation.
50.2.1 Preliminary Hazard List (Task 201). The PHL provides to
the MA a list of hazards that may require special safety design
emphasis or hazardous areas where in-depth analyses need to be
done. The MA may use the results of the PHL to determine the
scope of follow-on hazard analyses (PHA, SSHA, etc.). The PHL
may be documented using DI-SAFT-80101, System Safety Hazard
Analysis Report.
50.2.2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (Task 202).
50.2.2.1 PHA is, as implied by the title, the initial effort in
hazard analysis during the system design phase or the
programming and requirements development phase for facilities
acquisition. It may also be used on an operational system for
the initial examination of the state of safety. The purpose of
the PHA is not to affect control of all risks but to fully
recognize the hazardous states with all of the accompanying
system implications.
50.2.2.2 The PHA effort should be commenced during the initial
phases of system concept, or in the case of a fully operational
system, at the initiation of a safety evaluation. This will
help in the use of PHA results in tradeoff studies which are so
important in the early phases of system development or, in the
case of an operational system, aid in an early determination of
the state of safety. The output of the PHA may be used in
developing system safety requirements and in preparing
performance and design specifications. In addition, the PHA is
the basic hazard analysis which establishes the framework for
other hazard analyses which may be performed.
50.2.2.3 The PHA should include, but not be limited to, the
following activities:
(a) A review of pertinent historical safety experience.
(b) A categorized listing of basic energy sources.
(c) An investigation of the various energy sources to
determine the provisions which have been developed for
their control.
(d) Identification of the safety requirements and other
regulations pertaining to personnel safety, environmental
hazards, and toxic substances with which the system will
have to comply.
(e) Recommend corrective actions.
50.2.2.4 Since the PHA should be initiated very early in the
planning phase, the data available to the analyst may be
incomplete and informal. Therefore, structure the analysis to
permit continual revision and updating as the conceptual
approach is modified and refined. As soon as the subsystem
design details are complete enough to allow the analyst to begin
the subsystem hazard analysis in detail, terminate the PHA.
Provide the analyst performing the PHA with the following
reference input information:
(a) Design sketches, drawings, and data describing the
system and subsystem elements for the various conceptual
approaches under consideration.
(b) Functional flow diagrams and related data describing
the proposed sequence of activities, functions, and
operations, involving the system elements during the
contemplated life span.
(c) Background information related to safety requirements
associated with the contemplated testing, manufacturing,
storage, repair, and use locations and safety related
experiences of similar previous programs or activities.
50.2.2.5 The techniques used to perform this analysis must be
carefully selected to minimize problems in performing follow-on
analyses. The PHA may be documented as outlined in
DI-SAFT-80101, System Safety Hazard Analysis Report. There are
several formats that can be used. Some of these are:
50.2.2.5.1 Narrative format. The narrative format is
relatively unstructured and as a result there are many different
formats available. The format primarily depends on the analyst
and the type of information required from the analysis.
50.2.2.5.2 Matrix format. The matrix format is the most
commonly used approach for performing and documenting a PHA.
There are numerous varieties of PHA matrix formats in use, most
of which are fairly similar.
50.2.2.5.3 Other formats. The format used should be tailored
to reflect the nature of the system to be analyzed, the extent
of information about the system, and the planned use of the
analysis output data. Either format is acceptable and the
analyst must determine which can do the job most effectively.
The use of system safety design checklists, such as Air Force
Systems Command Design Handbook 1-X, in the performance of a PHA
can be a very effective method.
50.2.3 Subsystem Hazard Analysis (Task 203).
50.2.3.1 This task would be performed if a system under
development contained subsystems or components that when
integrated functioned together as a system. This analysis looks
at each subsystem or component and identifies hazards associated
with operating of failure modes and is especially intended to
determine how operation or failure of components affects the
overall safety of the system. This analysis should identify
necessary actions, using the system safety precedence to
determine how to eliminate or reduce the risk of identified
hazards.
50.2.3.2 As soon as subsystems are designed in sufficient
detail, or well into concept design for facilities acquisition,
the SSHA can begin. It should be updated as the design matures.
Design changes to components will also need to be evaluated to
determine whether the safety of the system is affected. The
techniques used for this analysis must be carefully selected to
minimize problems in integrating subsystem hazard analyses into
the system hazard analysis. The SSHA may be documented as
outlined in DI-SAFT-80101, System Safety Hazard Analysis Report.
50.2.4 System Hazard Analysis (Task 204).
50.2.4.1 An SHA is accomplished in much the same way as the
subsystem hazard analysis. However, as the SSHA examines how
component operation or failure affects the system, the SHA
determines how system operation and failure modes can affect the
safety of the system and its subsystems. The SHA should begin
as the system design matures, around the preliminary design
review or the facilities concept design review milestone, and
should be updated until the design is complete. Design changes
will need to be evaluated to determine their effects on the
safety of the system and its subsystems. This analysis should
contain recommended actions, applying the system safety
precedence, to eliminate or reduce the risk of identified
hazards.
50.2.4.2 Specifically, the SHA examines all subsystem
interfaces for:
(a) Compliance with safety criteria called out in the
applicable system/subsystem requirements documents.
(b) Possible combinations of independent or dependent
failures that can cause hazards to the system or
personnel. Failures of controls and safety devices should
be considered.
(c) How normal operations of systems and subsystems can
degrade the safety of the system.
(d) Design changes to system, subsystems, or interfaces,
logic, and software that can create new hazards to
equipment and personnel.
The techniques used to perform this analysis must be carefully
selected to minimize problems in integrating the SHA with other
hazard analyses. The SHA may be documented as outlined in
DI-SAFT-80101, System Safety Hazard Analysis Report.
50.2.5 Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA) (Task
205).
50.2.5.1 The O&SHA is performed primarily to identify and
evaluate the hazards associated with the environment, personnel,
procedures, and equipment involved throughout the operation of
a system/element. The O&SHA may be performed on such
activities as testing, installation, modification, maintenance,
support, transportation, ground servicing, storage, operations,
emergency escape, egress, rescue, post-accident responses, and
training. The O&SHA may also be selectively applied to
facilities acquisition projects to make sure operation and
maintenance manuals properly address safety and health
requirements.
50.2.5.2 The O∧SHA effort should start early enough to
provide inputs to the design and prior to system test and
operation. The O&SHA is most effective as a continuing closed-
loop iterative process, whereby proposed changes, additions, and
formulation of functional activities are evaluated for safety
considerations, prior to formal acceptance. The analyst
performing the O&SHA should have available:
(a) Engineering descriptions of the proposed system,
support equipment and facilities.
(b) Draft procedures and preliminary operating manuals.
(c) PHA, SSHA, and SHA reports.
(d) Related requirements, constraint requirements, and
personnel capabilities.
(e) Human factors engineering data and reports.
(f) Lessons learned, including a history of mishaps caused
by human error.
50.2.5.3 Timely application of the O&SHA will provide design
guidance. The findings and recommendations resulting from the
O&SHA may affect the diverse functional responsibilities
associated with a given program. Therefore, exercise care in
assuring that the analysis results are properly distributed for
the effected accomplishment of the O&SHA objectives. The
techniques used to perform this analysis must be carefully
selected to minimize problems in integrating O&SHAs with
other hazard analyses. The O&SHA may be documented using
DI-SAFT-80101, System Safety Hazard Analysis Report.
50.2.6 Occupational Health Hazard Assessment (Task 206).
50.2.6.1 The first step of the occupational health hazard
assessment is to identify and determine quantities of
potentially hazardous materials or physical agents (noise,
radiation, heat stress, cold stress) involved with the system
and its logistical support. The next step would be to analyze
how these materials or physical agents are used in the system
and for its logistical support. Based on the use, quantity, and
type of substance/agent, estimate where and how personnel
exposures may occur and if possible the degree or frequency of
exposure involved. The final step would include incorporation
into the design of the system and its logistical support
equipment/facilities cost effective controls to reduce exposures
to acceptable levels. The life cycle costs of required controls
could be high and consideration of alternative systems may be
appropriate.
50.2.6.2 The purpose of this analysis is not to dictate designs
based on health protection, but to assure decision makers are
aware of the health hazards involved and their impacts so that
knowledgeable decisions regarding potential tradeoffs can be
made.
50.2.6.3 The following factors associated with the system and
the logistical support required to operate and maintain the
system should be considered:
(a) Toxicity, quantity, and physical state of materials.
(b) Routine or planned uses and releases of hazardous
materials or physical agents.
(c) Accidental exposure potentials.
(d) Hazardous waste generated.
(e) Hazardous material handling, transfer, and
transportation requirements.
(f) Protective clothing/equipment needs.
(g) Detection and measurement devices required to quantify
exposure levels.
(h) Number of personnel potentially at risk.
(i) Engineering controls that could be used, such as
isolation, enclosure, ventilation, noise or radiation
barriers, etc.
50.2.6.4 To define the acceptable level of risk for health
hazards the MA should require use of chemical substance and
physical agent exposure limits found in appropriate regulations
and directive documents, or contact a qualified individual in
the bioenvironmental engineering or medical community. For
hazardous substances or agents with unspecified exposure limits
the contractor must provide the rationale for acceptable risk
criteria used for the OHHA. The OHHA may be documented using
DI-SAFT-80106, Occupational Health Hazard Assessment Report.
50.2.7 Safety Verification (Task 207).
50.2.7.1 Many safety requirements, as specified in system
specifications, requirements documents, etc., will need to be
verified by analysis, inspection, demonstration, or test. Also,
during design and development, hazard analyses will identify
hazards that will be removed through redesign, controls, safety
devices, etc. Imposition of these changes will require
verification. Task 207 outlines how safety verification should
be performed.
50.2.7.2 Much safety verification will be outlined in system/
subsystem test plans and procedures. However, for verification
of risk control actions taken on hazards identified during
development, special test plans/procedures will be needed.
Safety tests may be documented and reported using DI-SAFT-80102,
Safety Assessment Report, or they may be included in the system/
subsystem test reports.
50.2.8 Training (Task 208).
50.2.8.1 Many programs will require certification training of
personnel involved with development, test, and operations of the
system. A good system safety program can only be carried out if
all the players involved understand how to do their part.
Contractor design engineers need to understand basic system
safety principles to design hazard-free systems. A good
training program will include training design engineers as a top
priority. Managers need to be educated about the importance of
good initial safety designs vs. costly redesign and retrofits.
Contractor and Government test personnel need to be trained in
safe handling, operation, and testing of equipment. Operational
and maintenance personnel need safety training in their
functions.
50.2.8.2 Training can be accomplished in difference ways.
Formal classroom training sessions using a thorough lesson plan
containing all the necessary handouts is one of the most
effective and efficient methods. Imposing examinations and
final certification helps assure the trainees have understood
and will hopefully apply the material presented.
50.2.8.3 The contractor's safety training program should be
detailed in the SSPP (Task 101).
50.2.9 Safety Assessment (Task 209). The safety assessment, as
outlined in the task, can be written by following DI-SAFT-80102,
Safety Assessment Report. The importance of this report is that
it tells the user or the test team of all the residual unsafe
design of operating characteristics of the system. It also
attempts to quantify the risk of any hazards not eliminated, and
identifies any controls, inhibits, or safety procedures.
50.2.10 Safety Compliance Assessment (Task 210).
50.2.10.1 A safety compliance assessment is conducted to verify
the safe design of a system and to obtain a comprehensive
evaluation of the safety risk being assumed prior to test or
operation of a system. It can be documented by following
DI-SAFT-80102, Safety Assessment Report. It is an operationally
oriented analysis, concerned with the safe use of a system,
equipment, or facility. A safety compliance assessment is,
therefore, broad in scope, covering almost every aspect of the
system, but relatively general in nature, delving into detail
only to the extent necessary to verify the system's safety or
ascertain the risks and precautions necessary for its safe use.
A safety compliance assessment may be the only analysis
conducted on a program or it may serve as a pre-test or pre-
operational safety review, integrating and summarizing
operational safety considerations identified in more detailed
hazard analyses.
50.2.10.2 A safety compliance assessment may be the only
analysis conducted on a relatively low safety risk program. The
low risk can result from several different factors. The system
may be an integration of primarily off-the-shelf equipments
involving little or no new design. It may be a system which is
low risk by nature of its technology or complexity. Compliance
with federal, military, national, and industry specifications,
standards, and codes may be sufficient to make sure of the basic
safety of the system. A safety compliance assessment may also
be conducted on higher safety risk systems, such as research or
advanced development projects, where the higher risks must be
accepted, but for which safe operation is still required and the
risks must be recognized and reduced to acceptable levels.
50.2.10.3 This assessment may be conducted during any phase of
system development. It should be started as soon as sufficient
information becomes available. For example, evaluation of
equipment should begin with the design of equipment components
or with the receipt of equipment specifications from a
subcontractor or vendor. The analysis can also be tailored in
the SOW to meet the particular needs of a program.
50.2.10.4 A safety compliance assessment should include, but
not be limited to, the following:
(a) Identification of appropriate safety standards and
verification of system compliance. Standards may be
specified by the procuring agency in a specification or
other contractual document. This does not preclude the
contractor from identifying additional standards which are
appropriate. The contractor should also review available
historical safety data from similar systems. Verification
may be achieved by several methods, including analysis, use
of checklists, inspection, test, independent evaluation, or
manufacturer's certification.
(b) Analysis and resolution of system hazards. Systems,
even those comprised entirely of equipments in full
compliance with appropriate standards, may contain hazards
resulting from unique uses, interfaces, installation, etc.
Another facet of this assessment is to identify, evaluate,
and eliminate any such "residual" hazards or reduce their
associated risks to acceptable levels. To accomplish this,
the assessment should incorporate the scope and techniques
of other hazard analyses to the detail necessary to assure
a reasonably safe system.
(c) Identification of specialized safety requirements. The
above analysis should lead to safety design features and
other necessary precautions. The contractor should
identify all safety precautions necessary to safely operate
and support the system. This includes applicable
precautions external to the system or outside the
contractor's responsibility. For example, hazard
risk may have to be controlled by specialized safety
equipment and training because the contract does not allow
for redesign or modification of off-the-shelf equipments,
or the contractor may not be responsible for providing
necessary emergency lighting, fire protection, or personal
safety equipment.
(d) Identification of hazardous materials and the
precautions and procedures necessary for the safe handling
of the material.
50.2.11 Safety Review of Engineering Change Proposals and
Requests for Deviation/Waiver (Task 211). This task may be
documented using DI-SAFT-80103, Engineering Change Proposal
System Safety Report, and DI-SAFT-80104, Waiver or Deviation
System Safety Report. ECPs to the existing design and requests
for deviation/waiver from existing requirements must be assessed
for any possible safety impacts to the system. Often,
correction of a deficiency will introduce other overlooked
deficiencies. This task is designed to prevent that occurrence
by requiring contractor system safety engineers to examine each
ECP or request for deviation/waiver, and investigate all
conceivable ways the change or deviation could result in an
additional hazard(s). The task specifies that the MA be
notified if the ECP or request for deviation/waiver decreases
the existing level of safety.
50.2.12 RESERVED. For Software Hazard Analysis see 50.3.
50.2.13 GFE/GFP System Safety Analysis (Task 213).
50.2.13.1 This task should be imposed only if the system under
development will contain GFE or GFP that interfaces directly
with contractor developed hardware or software.
50.2.13.2 This task permits the contractor to integrate the
GFE/GFP items into the system design with full knowledge of the
associated hazards and risk controls by requiring acquisition of
existing analysis documentation. If no such documentation is
available, the contractor must perform the necessary analysis to
assure a safe interface. This analysis may be documented and
delivered by appropriately tailoring and applying DI-SAFT-80101,
System Safety Hazard Analysis Report.
50.3.0 Software System Safety. The purpose of Software System
Safety is to:
(a) Develop safety requirements for the system and the
software within the system.
(b) Ensure accurate translation of safety specification
requirements into System/Segment Specification (SSS) and
Software Requirements Specification (SRS) requirements, and
accurate translation of the SSS and SRS safety requirements
into the design and code of the software.
(c) Ensure that the SSS and SRSs clearly identify the
safety criteria to be used (fail-safe, fail-fire, fail-
soft, fail-operational, fail-recovery, etc.)
(d) Identify programs, Computer Software Components (CSCs),
routines, modules, or functions and their interfaces which
control or influence safety critical hardware functions.
These shall be designated Safety Critical Computer Software
Components (SCCSC).
(e) Analyze those Safety Critical Computer Software
Components and their system interfaces as designed or
implemented for events, faults, and environments which
could cause or contribute to undesired events affecting
safety.
(f) Analyze the implementation of safety design
requirements to ensure that it accomplishes the intent of
the requirement. The analysis should verify that there are
no single point or likely multiple failures that could
compromise the safety feature. Implementation of safety
requirements should not introduce new hazards or adversely
affect other safety requirements.
(g) Ensure that the actual coded software does not cause
identified or unidentified hazardous functions to occur or
inhibit desired functions, thus creating hazardous
conditions.
(h) Effectively mitigate end item hardware hazardous
anomalies.
(i) Ensure that safety design requirements are thoroughly
tested including fault testing.
The relationships between the various system, hardware, and
software safety analyses of MIL-STD-882B; the various reviews and
audits of MIL-STD-1521B; and the software documentation required
by DOD-STD-2167 are given in Table 3.
50.3.0.1 Some of the current analysis techniques and
methodologies that are available to conduct this analysis are:
(a) Software fault tree analysis
(b) Software sneak analysis
(c) Design walk-throughs
(d) Code walk-throughs
(e) Petri net analysis
(f) Software/Hardware integrated critical path analysis.
(g) Nuclear safety cross-check analysis
(h) Cross reference listing analysis
Due to the various strengths and weaknesses of each technique, a
thorough software hazard analysis will require application of
more than one of these techniques on a particular software
element. Additionally, the application of good software
engineering practices is vital to designing software that is safe
and analyzable.
50.3.0.2 Software System Safety must begin early in the concept
phase and must be structured to permit continual revision and
updating as the design matures. To ensure an effective analysis
effort, the following information is needed:
(a) System/Segment Specifications (SSSs), Software
Requirements Specifications (SRSs), Interface Requirements
Specifications (IRSs), and other allocation documents which
describe the system, all of the various software-software,
software-hardware, and software-operator interfaces, and
both normal and abnormal environments which the system
could encounter.
(b) Functional flow diagrams, timing diagrams, and related
data describing the proposed sequence and timing of
activities, functions, and operations involving the system
elements throughout the life cycle of the system.
(c) Computer program functional flow charts, or their
functional equivalents, The Program Design Language (PDL)
for the program, storage and timing allocation charts, and
other program structure documents as they become available,
or when they change.
(d) Background information related to safety requirements
associated with the planned testing, manufacturing,
shipping, handling, storage, repair, anticipated
operational and support environments, as well as lessons
learned from similar programs or activities.
(e) Known hazardous event sources, including energy and
toxic sources, especially those which may be controlled by
software.
(f) The Software Development Plan, Software Quality
Evaluation Plan, Software Configuration Management Plan,
and other system and subsystem development planning
documents.
(g) The System Test Plan, Software Test Plan, and other
test documentation.
50.3.1 Software Requirements Hazard Analysis (SRHA - Task 301).
The SRHA effort begins while the system requirements allocation
is being made. The SRHA first establishes a software safety
requirements tracking system within the configuration management
system. The SRHA also performs a thorough review and analysis of
software requirements aimed at identifying existing requirements
(as well as requirements generated from the PHL and system PHA)
and assuring an accurate flow down of those requirements into the
Software Requirements Specification.
Additionally, the analysis produces required and recommended
actions to eliminate identified hazards, or reduce their
associated risk to an acceptable level, and to make preliminary
testing requirements. This effort generally includes the
following:
(a) Review of the System/Segment Specification, Subsystem
Specifications, Software Requirements Specifications,
Interface Requirements Specification, and other system
concept and requirements documents to assure that:
(1) safety requirements have been allocated to the
software system;
(2) hazards from the PHL and system PHA have been
identified; and
(3) traceability of safety requirements exist from the
system specification to the detail software
requirements specifications.
(b) Analysis of functional flow diagrams (or their
functional equivalent), PDL, data flow diagrams, storage
and timing allocation charts, and other program
documentation to assure that specification and safety
requirements will be met.
The results of the SRHA are presented at, and are a part of, the
System Requirements Review (SRR), the System Design Review (SDR),
and the Software Specification Review.
50.3.2 Top-level Design Hazard Analysis (THDA - Task 302). The
THDA begins after the Software Specifications Review, and it
expands upon the SRHA. This analysis includes:
(a) Relating those hazards identified in the PHL, PHA, and
SRHA to specific CSC items, and identifying those CSCIs
which control or affect the hazards as Safety-Critical
Computer Software Components (SCCSCs).
(b) Examining the software to determine the independence/
dependence and interdependence among Computer Software
Components (CSCs), modules, tables, variables, etc.
Elements of software which directly or indirectly influence
SCCSCs will be identified as also being SCCSCs, which
should be analyzed for their undesired effects.
(c) Analyzing the top-level design of the SCCSCs for
compliance with the safety requirements, and passing the
results to the software designers and program manager.
The results of the TDA are presented at, and are a part of, the
Preliminary Design Review (PDR).
50.3.3 Detailed Design Hazard Analysis (DDHA - Task 303). The
DDHA begins after the PDR, and it expands upon and is a follow-
on to the Top-Level Software Hazard Analysis. This analysis
includes the following:
(a) Relating those hazards identified in the PHA, SRHA, and
TDHA to specific low level CSC components, and identifying
those components which control of affect the hazards as
SCCSCs, which must be analyzed for correctness and
undesired effects.
(b) Examining the software to determine the independence/
dependence and interdependence among low level components,
modules, tables, variables, etc. Elements of software
which directly or indirectly influence SCCSCs will also be
identified as being SCCSCs, which must be analyzed for
correctness and undesired effects.
(c) Analyzing the detailed design of the SCCSCs for
compliance with the safety requirements, and passing the
results to the Software designers and program manager.
(d) Developing requirements for inclusion in test plans,
descriptions, and procedures.
(e) Developing requirements for inclusion in the Computer
System Operator's Manual, Software User's Manual, Computer
System Diagnostic Manual, and Firmware Support Manual, and
other manuals as appropriate.
(f) Ensure that the code developers know which are the
SCCSCs. Also, provide the code developers with safety-
related coding recommendations and requirements.
The results of the DDHA, and all other previously conducted
safety analyses, are presented at, and are a part of, the
Critical Design Review (CDR).
50.3.4 Code-level Software Hazard Analysis (CSHA - Task 304).
This analysis examines the actual source and object code of
SCCSCs and other CSCs to verify the actual design
implementation. This effort must start when coding commences,
and be updated until testing is complete. This analysis
identifies actions required to eliminate identified hazards or
reduce their associated risk to an acceptable level. The
analyst shall participate in code reviews and walk-throughs and
should participate in peer reviews of code. Specifically, this
analysis examines:
(a) SCCSCs (algorithms, components, modules, routines, and
calculations) for correctness and for input/output, timing,
multiple event, wrong event, out-of-sequence, adverse
environment, deadlocking, inappropriate magnitude, and
other types of sensitivities.
(b) Programs, components, routines, modules, or functions
for design or coding errors which could cause or contribute
to an undesired event affecting safety.
(c) SCCSCs for compliance with safety criteria called out
in applicable SSSs or SRSs. Safety critical portions of
software must be examined at the source and object code
level as well as at the top level and detailed design
levels.
(d) SCCSCs for implementation of safety design requirements
to ensure that the intent of the requirement is met. The
analyst shall determine that single point or likely
multiple failures on inputs from external hardware or other
modules cannot result in compromise of the safety features.
Tests should be designed to test the safety features
including fault mode and no-go path testing.
(e) Possible combinations of independent, dependent, or
interdependent hardware or software failures, unintended
program jumps, single or multiple events, or out-of-order
events that could cause the system to operate in a
hazardous manner.
(f) Single or multiple combinations of out-of-bounds or
overloading input conditions.
Additionally, this task requires a review of the software
documentation being developed to ensure that the safety features
and requirements of the software are included. The results of
the CSHA are presented, and are a part of, the Test Readiness
Review (TRR). However, results of the CSHA for lower level units
must be given to the programmers while the codes is being
developed.
50.3.5 Software Safety Testing (Task 305). Testing of the
lower level units of the software begins almost immediately
after coding of the unit has been completed. System level
testing of the software begins after a successful TRR. Testing,
and support of testing, by the contractor's safety personnel
includes the following:
(a) Ensuring that the identified safety hazards have been
eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level of risk by
submitting SCCSCs to appropriate safety testing.
(b) Providing appropriate test procedures, cases, and
inputs to test personnel to test the SCCSCs for safe and
proper operation.
(c) Ensuring that all of the SCCSCs are tested in
accordance with the approved test procedures, and that the
test results are accurately recorded.
(d) Testing the software under abnormal environmental and
input conditions, as well as normal conditions, and
ensuring that it performs properly and safely under these
conditions.
(e) Subjecting the software to stress testing and
acceptance testing to ensure that it performs properly and
safely under stress conditions.
(f) Ensuring that commercially-developed, commercially-
available, proprietary, and other software that was not
specifically developed under this contract but that will be
included in the system performs properly and safely. This
applies whether the software is used as-is or is modified
by the contractor.
(g) Ensuring that any Government Furnished Software,
whether modified or not, that will be used in the system
performs properly and safely.
(h) Ensuring that safety hazards, and other deficiencies
and discrepancies, that are discovered during system
integration and system acceptance testing will be corrected
and retested to be sure that they are no longer a problem.
50.3.6 Software/User Interface Analysis (Task 306). The user/
operator interface to a program must be developed to ensure that
the system will be operated in a safe manner. Further, even
after all of the safety analyses and design changes are done,
there still may be safety hazards in the system which cannot be
eliminated or controlled strictly in the design. Procedures
must be developed that will do the following:
(a) Provide for the detection of the onset of a hazardous
or potentially hazardous condition in order to prevent the
hazard from occurring.
(b) Control the hazard so that it occurs only in specific
instances and on specific command from the operator.
(c) Provide a warning to the operator, user, and other
personnel indicating that a potentially hazardous situation
is about to occur or is occurring.
(d) Ensure that the system will survive if hazard occurs.
(e) Provide damage control and recovery procedures should
a hazard occur, or if prevention and control procedures
fail.
(f) Provide survival and recovery procedures from critical
hazard conditions.
(g) Provide the capability to safely abort or cancel an
event, process, or program if required.
(h) Provide a warning to the operator to alert him of
system or software malfunctions or failures, and ensure
that the operator is made of all such failures existing at
one time. This may change the manner in which failures are
cleared or overridden.
(i) Ensure that the display of hazard data is unambiguous
and provides the operator all necessary data to make safety
critical decisions.
50.3.7 Software Change Hazard Analysis (Task 307). Change
Analysis is the examining and analyzing of changes,
modifications, and patches to specifications, requirements,
equipment, software, design, and source and object code for
safety impact. If a change has not been analyzed, the system
cannot be assumed to be safe. This analysis includes the
following:
(a) Analyzing design changes and modifications, and code
changes and patches to the system, subsystem, interfaces,
logic, procedures, and software for safety impact ensuring
that the change does not create new hazards, does not
affect a hazard that has previously been resolved, does not
make a currently-existing hazard more severe than it
currently is, and does not adversely affect any related or
interfacing design or code.
(b) Testing the changes to ensure that the new software
does not contain safety hazards, whether these hazards are
previously known or not.
(c) Ensuring that the change is properly and correctly
incorporated into the code.
(d) Reviewing and updating the documentation to reflect
these changes.
(e) Incorporating the methods and procedures for performing
this task in the Software Configuration Management Plan.
50.3.8 Documentation. The Software Hazard Analysis is
documented as part of the System Safety Hazard Analysis Report,
using DI-SAFT-80101, tailored as required.
TABLE 3. Relationships
APPENDIX B
SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO LIFE CYCLE PHASES
60. SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO LIFE CYCLE
PHASES.
60.1 Mission need determination--concept exploration.
60.1.1 Mission Need Determination. The system safety effort
will support the justification of major system new starts by
identifying safety deficiencies in existing or projected
capability and by identifying opportunities for system safety to
improve mission capability or reduce life cycle costs.
60.1.2 Concept Exploration/Programming and Requirements
Development Phase. System safety tasks applicable to the
concept exploration/programming and requirements development
phase are those required to evaluate the alternative system
concepts under consideration for development and establish the
system safety programs consistent with the identified mission
needs and life cycle requirements. System safety tasks will
include the following:
(a) Prepare an SSPP to describe the proposed integrated
system safety effort for the concept exploration phase.
(b) Evaluate all considered materials, design features,
maintenance, servicing, operational concepts, and
environments which will affect safety throughout the life
cycle. Consider hazards which may be encountered in the
ultimate disposition of the entire system, or components
thereof, or of dedicated support equipment, which
encompasses hazardous materials and substances.
(c) Perform a PHA to identify hazards associated with each
alternative concept.
(d) Identify possible safety interface problems including
problems associated with software-controlled system
functions.
(e) Highlight special areas of safety consideration, such
as system limitations, risks, and man-rating requirements.
(f) Review safe and successful designs of similar systems
for consideration in alternative concepts.
(g) Define the system safety requirements based on past
experience with similar systems.
(h) Identify safety requirements that may require a waiver
during the system life cycle.
(i) Identify any safety design analysis, test,
demonstration and validation requirements.
(j) Document the system safety analyses, results, and
recommendations for each promising alternative system
concept.
(k) Prepare a summary report of the results of the system
safety tasks conducted during the program initiation phase
to support the decision-making process.
(l) Tailor the system safety program for the subsequent
phases of the life cycle and include detailed requirements
in the appropriate demonstration and validation phase
contractual documents.
60.1.3 Demonstration and Validation/Concept Design Phase.
System safety tasks during the demonstration and validation/
concept design phase will be tailored to programs ranging from
extensive study and analyses through hardware development to
prototype testing, demonstration and validation. System safety
tasks will include the following:
(a) Prepare or update the SSPP to describe the proposed
integrated system safety effort planned for the
demonstration and validation/concept design phase.
(b) Participate in tradeoff studies to reflect the impact
on system safety requirements and risk. Recommend system
design changes based on these studies to make sure the
optimum degree of safety is achieved consistent with
performance and system requirements.
(c) Perform or update the PHA done during the concept
exploration/programming and requirements development phase
to evaluate the configuration to be tested. Prepare an SHA
report of the test configuration considering the planned
test environment and test methods.
(d) Establish system safety requirements for system design
and criteria for verifying that these requirements have
been met. Identify the requirements for inclusion in the
appropriate specifications.
(e) Perform detailed hazard analyses (SSHA or SHA) of the
design to assess the risk involved in test operation of the
system hardware and software. Obtain and include risk
assessment of other contractor's furnished equipment, of
GFE, and of all interfacing and ancillary equipment to be
used during system demonstration tests. Identify the need
for special tests to demonstrate/evaluate safety functions.
(f) Identify critical parts and assemblies, production
techniques, assembly procedures, facilities, testing, and
inspection requirements which may affect safety and will
make sure:
(1) Adequate safety provisions are included in the
planning and layout of the production line to establish
safety control of the demonstration system within the
production processes and operations.
(2) Adequate safety provisions are included in inspections,
tests, procedures, and checklists for quality control
of the equipment being manufactured so that safety
achieved in design is maintained during production.
(3) Production and manufacturing control data contain
required warnings, cautions, and special safety
procedures.
(4) Testing and evaluation are performed on early
production hardware to detect and correct safety
deficiencies at the earliest opportunity.
(5) Minimum risk is involved in accepting and using new
design, materials, and production and test techniques.
(g) Establish analysis, inspection and test requirements
for GFE or other contractor-furnished equipment (hardware,
software, and facilities) to verify prior to use that
applicable system safety requirements are satisfied.
(h) Perform operating and support hazard analyses of each
test, and review all test plans and procedures. Evaluate
the interfaces between the test system configuration and
personnel, support equipment, special test equipment, test
facilities, and the test environment during assembly,
checkout, operation, foreseeable emergencies, disassembly
and/or tear-down of the test configuration. Make sure
hazards identified by analyses and tests are eliminated or
the associated risk is minimized. Identify the need for
special tests to demonstrate or evaluate safety of test
functions.
(i) Review training plans and programs for adequate safety
considerations.
(j) Review system operation and maintenance publications
for adequate safety considerations, and ensure the
inclusion of applicable Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) requirements.
(k) Review logistic support publications for adequate
safety considerations, and ensure the inclusion of
applicable US Department of Transportation (DOT), US
Environment Protection Agency (EPA), and OSHA requirements.
(l) Evaluate results of safety tests, failure analyses, and
mishap investigations performed during the demonstration
and validation phase. Recommend redesign or other
corrective action (this subparagraph does not apply to the
facility concept design phase).
(m) Make sure system safety requirements are incorporated
into the system specification/design document based on
updated system safety studies, analyses, and tests.
(n) Prepare a summary report of the results of the system
safety tasks conducted during the demonstration and
validation/concept development phase to support the
decision-making process.
(o) Continue to tailor the system safety program. Prepare
or update the SSPP for the full-scale engineering
development phase and production phase.
60.1.4 Full-Scale Engineering Development/Final Design Phase.
To provide support to the system engineering program, the system
safety tasks during the full-scale engineering development/final
design phase will include the following:
(a) Prepare or update as applicable the SSPP for the full-
scale engineering development phase. Continue effective and
timely implementation of the SSPP during facility final
design phase.
(b) Review preliminary engineering designs to make sure
safety design requirements are incorporated and hazards
identified during the earlier phases are eliminated or the
associated risks reduced to an acceptable level.
(c) Update system safety requirements in system
specification/design documents.
(d) Perform or update the SSHA, SHA and O&SHA and safety
studies concurrent with the design/test effort to identify
design and/or operating and support hazards. Recommend any
required design changes and control procedures.
(e) Perform an O&SHA for each test, and review all test
plan and procedures. Evaluate the interfaces between the
test system configuration and personnel, support equipment,
special test equipment, test facilities, and the test
environment during assembly, check-out, operations,
foreseeable emergencies, disassembly, and/or tear-down of
the test configuration. Make sure hazards identified by
analyzes and tests are eliminated or their associated risk
controlled. Identify the need for special tests to
demonstrate or verify system safety functions. Establish
analyses, inspection, and test requirements for other
contractors' or GFE/GFP (hardware, software, and
facilities) to verify prior to use that applicable system
safety requirements are satisfied.
(f) Participate in technical design and program reviews and
present results of the SSHA, SHA and/or O&SHA.
(g) Identify and evaluate the effects of storage, shelf-
life, packaging, transportation, handling, test, operation,
and maintenance on the safety of the system and its
components.
(h) Evaluate results of safety testing, other system tests,
failure analyses and mishap investigations. Recommend
redesign or other corrective action.
(i) Identify, evaluate, and provide safety considerations
or tradeoff studies.
(j) Review appropriate engineering documentation (drawings,
specifications, etc.) to make sure safety considerations
have been incorporated.
(k) Review logistic support publications for adequate
safety considerations, and ensure the inclusion of
applicable DOT, EPA, and OSHA requirements.
(l) Verify the adequacy of safety and warning devices, life
support equipment, and personal protective equipment.
(m) Identify the need for safety training and provide
safety inputs to training courses.
(n) Provide system safety surveillance and support of test
unit production and of planning for full-scale production
and deployment. Identify critical parts and assemblies,
production techniques, assembly procedures, facilities,
testing, and inspection requirements which may affect
safety and will make sure:
(1) Adequate safety provisions are included in the
planning and layout of the production line to establish
safety control of the demonstration system within the
production process and operations.
(2) Adequate safety provisions are included in
inspections, tests, procedures, and checklists for
quality control of the equipment being manufactured so
that safety achieved is design is maintained during
production.
(3) Production and manufacturing control data contain
required warnings, cautions, and special safety
procedures.
(4) Testing and evaluation are performed on early
production hardware to detect and correct safety
deficiencies at the earliest opportunity.
(5) Minimum risk is involved in accepting and using new
designs, materials, and production and test techniques.
(o) Make sure procedures developed for system test,
maintenance, operation, and servicing provide for safe
disposal of expendable hazardous materials. Consider any
material or manufactured component (whether or not an
identifiable spare part or replentishable component) when
access to hazardous material will be required by personnel
during planned servicing, teardown, or maintenance
activities, or in reasonably foreseeable unplanned events
resulting from workplace operations. Safety data developed
in SSHAs, SHAs, and O&SHAs, and summarized in safety
assessment reports must also identify any hazards which
must be considered when the system, or components thereof,
are eventually demilitarized and subject to disposal. (Not
applicable for facilities construction.)
(p) Prepare a summary report of the results of the system
safety tasks conducted during the full-scale engineering
development phase to support the decision-making process.
(q) Tailor or system safety program requirements for the
production and deployment phase.
60.1.5 Production and Deployment Phase. As part of the on-going
system safety program, the system safety tasks during the
production and deployment phase will include the following (this
paragraph is not applicable to the facilities construction life
cycle.):
(a) Prepare or update the SSPP to reflect the system safety
program requirements for the production and deployment
phase.
(b) Identify critical parts and assemblies, production
techniques, assembly procedures, facilities, testing, and
inspection requirements which may affect safety and will
make sure:
(1) Adequate safety provisions are included in the
planning and layout of the production line to establish
safety control of the system within the production
process and operations.
(2) Adequate safety provisions are included in
inspections, tests, procedures, and checklists for
quality control of the equipment being manufactured so
that safety achieved in design is maintained during
production.
(3) Production technical manuals or manufacturing
procedures contain required warnings, cautions, and
special procedures.
(4) Minimum risk is involved in accepting and using new
designs, materials, and production and test techniques.
(c) Verify that testing and evaluation is performed on
early production hardware to detect and correct safety
deficiencies at the earliest opportunity.
(d) Perform O&SHAs of each test, and review all test plans
and procedures. Evaluate the interfaces between the test
system configuration and personnel, support equipment,
special test equipment, test facilities, and the test
environment during assembly, checkout, operation,
foreseeable emergencies, disassembly and/or tear-down of
the test configuration. Make sure hazards identified by
analyses and tests are eliminated or their associated risk
reduced to an acceptable level.
(e) Review technical data for warnings, cautions, and
special procedures identified as requirements in the O&SHA
for safe operation, maintenance, servicing, storage,
packaging, handling, and transportation.
(f) Perform O&SHAs of deployment operations, and review all
deployment plans and procedures. Evaluate the interfaces
between the system being deployed with personnel, support
equipment, packaging, facilities, and the deployment
environment, during transportation, storage, handling,
assembly, installation, checkout, and demonstration/test
operations. Make sure hazards identified by analyses are
eliminated or their associated risk is reduced to an
acceptable level.
(g) Review procedures and monitor results of periodic field
inspections or tests (including recall-for-tests) to make
sure acceptable levels of safety are kept. Identify major
or critical characteristics of safety significant items
that deteriorate with age, environmental conditions, or
other factors.
(h) Perform or update hazard analyses to identify any new
hazard that may result from design changes. Make sure the
safety implications of the changes are considered in all
configuration control actions.
(i) Evaluate results of failure analyses and mishap
investigations. Recommend corrective action.
(j) Monitor the system throughout the life cycle to
determine the adequacy of the design, and operating,
maintenance, and emergency procedures.
(k) Conduct a safety review of proposed new operating and
maintenance procedures, or changes, to make sure the
procedures, warnings, and cautions are adequate and
inherent safety is not degraded. These reviews shall be
documented as updates to the O&SHAs.
(l) Document hazardous conditions and system deficiencies
for development of follow-on requirements for modified or
new systems.
(m) Update safety documentation, such as design handbooks,
military standards and specifications, to reflect safety
"lessons learned."
(n) Evaluate the adequacy of safety and warning devices,
life support equipment, and personnel protective equipment.
60.1.6 Construction Phase. As part of the continuing system
safety program for facilities, the system safety tasks for this
phase will include the following:
(a) Ensure the application of all relevant building safety
codes including OSHA, National Fire Protection Association,
and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers safety requirements.
(b) Conduct hazard analyses to determine safety
requirements at all interfaces between the facility and
those systems planned for installation.
(c) Review equipment installation, operation, and
maintenance plans to make sure all design and procedural
safety requirements have been met.
(d) Continue the updating of the hazard correction tracking
begun during the design phases.
(e) Evaluate mishaps or other losses to determine if they
were the result of safety deficiencies or oversight.
(f) Update hazard analyses to identify any new hazards that
may result from change orders.
60.2 System safety program requirements for other
acquisitions. For programs that do not follow the standard
system life cycle phases outlined in the previous paragraphs the
responsible activity must carefully integrate the requirements
of this standard into the acquisition process being used.
Although different, facilities, ship construction, and certain
major one-of-a-kind procurements still evolve through a concept/
design/assembly/acceptance sequence somewhat analogous to the
classic life cycle. The MA should carefully describe what
system safety data are to be submitted in the appropriate
contractual document, assuring these data are submitted prior to
key decision points.
60.3 System Safety Requirements for Technology Development.
Consider system safety during development of technology.
System safety concerns should be documented. This documentation
will provide the system safety background data necessary should
a decision be made to implement the technology within a system
development program.
APPENDIX C
DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR MIL-STD-882B
70. DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR MIL-STD-882B.
70.1 Data item descriptions and the paragraphs of MIL-STD-882B
where their requirements are located are as follows:
Paragraph Location DID No.
Task 100 N/A
Task 101 DI-SAFT-80100
Task 102 DI-SAFT-80100
Task 103 As per CDRL
Task 104 As per CDRL
Task 105 DI-SAFT-80105
Task 106 As per CDRL
Task 107 DI-SAFT-80105
Task 108 As per CDRL
Task 201 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 202 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 203 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 204 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 205 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 206 DI-SAFT-80106
Task 207 DI-SAFT-80102
Task 208 As per CDRL
Task 209 DI-SAFT-80102
Task 210 DI-SAFT-80102
Task 211 DI-SAFT-80103/DI-SAFT-80104
Task 212 - RESERVED - N/A
Task 213 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 301 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 302 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 303 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 304 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 305 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 306 DI-SAFT-80101
Task 307 DI-SAFT-80101
NOTE: The latest version of each data item description required
will be used unless otherwise directed by the MA.
SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS REQUISITION
Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0230
Expires Dec 31, 1991
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is
estimated to average 30 minutes per response including the time
for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources
gathering and maintaining the data needed and completing and
reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding
this burden estimate of any other aspect of this collection of
information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to
Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for information
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204,
Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and
Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0230) Washington, DC
20503. Please DO NOT RETURN your form to either of these
addresses. Send your completed form to address in item 9 of
instructions
1. CUSTOMER NUMBER (Mandatory for Repeat Orders to expedite
requests), CAGE CODE, OR UIC NUMBER
2. YOUR ADDRESS (Print or Type)
[ ] IF YOUR ADDRESS HAS CHANGED, X THIS
BLOCK.
3. ATTENTION:
4. DOCUMENTS REQUESTED
a. STANDARDIZATION DOCUMENT NUMBER b. QUANTITY c. TITLE
(Restricted to 5) (From Dod Index of Specifications and
Standards)
INSTRUCTIONS
1. PRINT OR TYPE ALL INFORMATION.
2. Enter your customer number, CAGE (formerly FSCM), or UIC
number at the top of this form. It will expedite your order.
3. If you have a customer number, use the Telephone Order Entry
System (TOES) for telephone orders: (215)697-1187 between the
hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Monday
through Friday. See "Guide to Private Industry" for details.
4. Documents ordered must appear in the DoD Index of
Specifications and Standards (DODISS) or DODISS Notice.
Requests submitted on this form will speed service. Reorder
forms will be enclosed with each shipment.
5. Requests for Official Use Documents or documents without
Distribution Statement "A" must be submitted via cognizant DoD
Inspection Officer or Contract Administrator for certification
of "need to know."
6. Non Government Standardization Documents will not be furnished
to commercial concerns. Copies may be purchased from the
appropriate Non Government Standards Body.
7. Questions concerning documents not listed in the Department
of Defense Index of Specifications and Standards (DODISS) or
DODISS Notice should be directed to NPFC Attn: Code 105.
Telephone: (215)697-2667 or (215)697-2179.
8. Further information may be obtained from NPFC "Guide to
Private Industry." Order as GUIDE-1.
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